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GENDER TYPING IN STEREO: THE TRANSGENDER
DILEMMA IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Richard F. Storrow*
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) prohibits discrimination
against men because they are men and against women because they are women.
This familiar characterization of the Act has been quoted in dozens of sex dis-
crimination cases to support a narrow view of who is protected against sex dis-
crimination in this country. When transsexuals file suit,
[e]mployment discrimination jurisprudence at both the federal and state levels..
.captures transsexuals in a discourse of exclusion from social participation. This
wide net, using a remarkably refined system of semantic manipulations, snags all
claims launched by transsexuals and reveals that no matter how a transsexual
frames her discrimination claim, it will fail.2
In this Article, I explore whether those words, written after a thorough examina-
tion of employment discrimination claims brought by transsexuals in both federal
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. J.D., Columbia Law
School, 1993; M.A., Columbia University, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. I wish to thank
and congratulate my University of Illinois College of Law Introduction to Advocacy students
who, in the spring of 1998, responded to a very challenging legal problem with great profession-
alism. I thank Texas Wesleyan University for providing me with the research support that made
the preparation of this Article possible.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (2000).
2. Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent Jurisprudence of
Transsexualism," 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 310 (1997) [hereinafter Naming]. In Naming, I
explained my theory about "why the issues of gender incongruence posed by transsexualism are
troubling to the bench." Id. at 276. At the risk of the article's offending commentators who
object to applying the techniques of literary criticism to interpret the law, see, for example,
RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 13, 17, 216, 218, 249-55
(1988), I drew on my background as a student of literature and decided to compare critical
responses to the literary convention of the grotesque, Naming, supra, at 278-79, 329-30, 333-34,
post-structuralist literary criticism, id. at 279, 298, and certain of Sigmund Freud's writings, see
id. at 279-80, 298, 299-302, with judicial responses to transgendered plaintiffs and their legal
claims. In writing the article at all, I realize now I was hazarding creating scholarship that
would have no credibility even among members of the subject class, see Phyllis Randolph Frye,
The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. The Cider House Rules: Transgenders Struggle with
the Courts Over What Clothing They Are Allowed to Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They Are
Allowed to Use on the Job, Their Right to Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 151 (2000) (noting that while nontransgender writers on transgenderism
may be sensitive and caring, they are not "in-the-skin, living-the-life, or feeling-the-pain"). I
nonetheless take reassurance from the knowledge that the struggles of disenfranchised groups
often inspire commentary from those not disenfranchised in exactly same way, id., and that
these commentators do not always suffer thereby any great diminution in their authority to ex-
press their views on the matter. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002) (Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., of the Yale Law School,
reviewing this book, commented that "Koppelman's arguments cannot be ignored by any offi-
cial or person who must consider gay rights claims.").
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and state courts, need revision in light of recent case law suggesting that the courts
are prepared to recognize gender stereotyping as a viable legal theory of sex dis-
crimination for both men and for women. In Part II, I describe the fictional case of
a transgendered worker suing her employer for sex discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the challenges faced by the law students work-
ing on both sides of the matter. In Part III, I explore the current contours of the
gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination and consider how useful such a
theory could be to transgendered employees seeking redress for sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I conclude that sex discrimination
claims brought by transgendered workers still confront enormous obstacles and
that, despite the expanded judicial recognition of gender stereotyping claims, will
continue to be difficult to advance into the future.
II. A VERY CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENT
In the spring of 1998, students in Section B-2 of Introduction to Advocacy at
the University of Illinois College of Law were given a very challenging assign-ment. The course requires students to argue one side of a complex legal problem
both in writing and orally. From a pedagogical standpoint, one of the goals of the
course is that students learn how to transform the emotional reactions a problem
engenders into convincing legal arguments. 3 The topics of the problems I had
assigned the previous two times I had taught the course were, in 1996, same-sex
sexual harassment and, in 1997, the compulsory sterilization of developmentally
disabled individuals. Although these topics were and remain volatile, I wanted
students in B-2 to tackle a problem that would cause them to question their as-
sumptions about the world in ways the other two problems would not.
A. Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co.
At the beginning of the term, each student received a memo announcing that,
for the rest of the semester, he or she would act as a lawyer working on one side of
a fictional Title VII employment discrimination matter brought in federal district
court under the caption Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co.4 Each student's
task would be to write a memorandum of law in support of a motion for summary
judgment. A few days later, each student received a file containing a complaint
alleging illegal sex discrimination brought by June G. Craig in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois against Hudson, a Champaign,
Illinois, company subject to federal employment discrimination provisions and
co-owned by sisters Blanche and Jane Hudson.5 Following the complaint was
3. See Grace Tonner & Diana Pratt, Selecting and Designing Effective Legal Writing Prob-
lems, 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 163, 170 (1997); Jeanne Curran et al., Moot
Court: Collaborative Thinking on Your Feet, Sept. 7, 2000, at http://www.csudh.edu/
dearhabermas/apsawashver.htm (on file with Maine Law Review) ("One of the problems in
moot court is the difficulty of finding balanced legal issues.").
4. Memorandum from Richard F. Storrow, to Introduction to Advocacy Section B-2, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law (Jan. 20, 1997) (on file with Maine Law Review).
5. Complaint II, IV, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997)
(97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created by author for classroom use) (on file with Maine
Law Review) [hereinafter Complaint]..
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Hudson's answer, laying out its denials, admissions, and affirmative defenses to
Craig's complaint. 6 In essence, Hudson denied discriminating against Craig on
the basis of her sex and asserted that its termination of Craig was in full compli-
ance with Title VII.7
In addition to the pleadings, the file contained documents generated in the
discovery process. These were excerpts from the depositions of Craig and of
Blanche Hudson, who was responsible for decisions regarding the hiring and re-
tention of personnel at Hudson, and an affidavit of Dr. J. Joris Hage, 8 Craig's
attending physician and a medical expert on the causes and treatment of
transsexualism.
The excerpts from Craig's deposition revealed that Craig had begun living as
a female three years before taking a job on the assembly line in Hudson's airtool
division in June of 1995.9 As a part of her transition, Craig obtained a court order
to have the gender marker on her birth records and other legal documents altered to
indicate that she was a female. 10 At all times during the application process and
during her employment with Hudson, Craig represented herself as a woman. 11
Craig described her employment at Hudson as relatively uneventful, except for
certain incidents in the women's restroom. 12 Craig mentioned that women in the
restroom would sometimes linger while she was present and seemed to take a keen
6. Answer, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997) (97 Civ.
3384) (fictional document created by author for classroom use) (on file with Maine Law Re-
view) (hereinafter Answer].
7. See Answer, supra note 6, 5, 7.
8. J. Joris Hage is fictionalized in Craig as the chairman of the Department of Gender Iden-
tity Disorders at Champaign County General Hospital, Champaign, Illinois, and his testimony is
a composite of the opinions of several medical experts on transsexualism. Hage wrote Medical
Requirements and Consequences of Sex Reassignment Surgery, published in Transsexualism,
Medicine and Law, Proceedings of the XXIIIrd Colloquy on European Law in 1995.
9. Deposition of June G. Craig at 1, 2, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. I11.
Jan. 5, 1998) (97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created by author for classroom use) (on file
with Maine Law Review) [hereinafter Craig Deposition].
10. See Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 2, 4, 5. Illinois's change-of-birth-certificate stat-
ute, in relevant part, reads as follows:
For a person born in this State, the State Registrar of Vital Records shall establish a
new certificate of birth when he receives any of the following:
(d) An affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation on a person, and
that by reason of the operation the sex designation on such person's birth record should
be changed. The State Registrar of Vital Records may make any investigation or
require any further information he deems necessary.
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(l)(d) (West, WESTLAW through 2002 Reg. Sess.). An Illinois
driver's license may be reissued "to correct a statement appearing upon the original permit or
license...." 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-114 (West, WESTLAW through 2002 Reg. Sess.).
Phyllis Frye, the Executive Director of the International Conference on Transgender Law and
Employment Policy pioneered the procedure of changing the gender marker on birth certificates
and other legal documents prior to sex reassignment surgery. Naming, supra note 2, at 331
n.294.
11. Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 2.
12. Id.
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interest in her. 13 She concluded that these women were lesbian and thought noth-
ing more about their behavior. 14
Not long after she began working for Hudson, Craig met and eventually mar-
ried a man named Lane. 15 At this point, Craig's estrogen treatment had resulted in
irreversible changes to her body, including infertility and chemical castration, ren-
dering it impossible for her to use the restroom while standing up. 16 At this point,
she and Lane decided the time had come to consider sex reassignment surgery. 17
Craig fully understood that the surgery would not give her ovaries or a uterus. 18
Hoping to obtain a six-month leave of absence from Hudson for this purpose, Craig
approached Blanche Hudson on October 27, 1997, and asked her for time off to
have surgery. 19 At no time did Blanche ask or did Craig reveal to Blanche the
purpose of the surgery.20 After Craig made her request, Blanche discharged her,
claiming Craig had been a "disruptive influence at Hudson" and that Blanche her-
self and some of the other women at the company had been troubled by Craig's
behavior.2 1 At the time she was deposed in this litigation, Craig had been living as
a woman for six years. 22
The excerpts from Blanche Hudson's deposition told a different story. Blanche
testified that she and others at Hudson had always known Craig "was a man" from
the way she dressed and how she walked. 23 In particular, Blanche noticed that
Craig, unlike the company's secretaries, never wore frilly or lacy blouses, high-
heeled shoes, or jewelry and that Craig was, more generally, "just not ladylike."'24
Although Blanche admitted that feminine accoutrements were not commonly worn
by female workers on the assembly line and that safety concerns might preclude
the wearing of such items,25 she also claimed to have received reports from con-
13. Id. at 2 ("I guess the only weird thing was that some of the other women were always a
little funny with me. Like when I would go to the bathroom and stuff. Some of the women
seemed to be hanging out in there and watching me.").
14. Id. at 2 ("I kind of thought they might be have been queers, but what the hell. Even
though I'm not one, queers are cool.").
15. Id. at 4. To obtain a marriage license in Illinois, the parties need only submit "satisfactory
proof that the marriage is not prohibited." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203(2) (West, WESTLAW
through 2002 Reg. Sess.). Marriages between males and postoperative male-to-female trans-
sexuals have been deemed invalid in recent decisions based on reasoning that a person's chro-
mosomal sex cannot be changed. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 121-22 (Kan.
2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). This reasoning has led
commentators to characterize recent marriages between females and male-to-female transsexu-
als as valid same-sex marriages. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-
Sex Marriages Have Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV.
1031, 1033-34 (2001).
16. Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 3, 5; see Affidavit, infra note 31, 11.
17. Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 3. Craig made clear that the surgery was not essential
to the survival of her marriage but was "something that seemed inevitable." Id. Craig refused to
discuss how she functioned sexually with her husband. See id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 3-4.
21. Id. at 3, 4.
22. Id. at 2.
23. See Deposition of Blanche Hudson at 1, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co.
(C.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1998) (97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created by author for classroom use)
(on file with Maine Law Review) [hereinafter Hudson Deposition].




cerned female employees that Craig was standing up to urinate in the women's
restroom. 26 When asked her reasons for terminating Craig's employment, Blanche
explained that when Craig asked for time off to have surgery, "it just clicked" that
Craig was "queer. '"27 Blanche concluded that Craig was a gay man who wanted to
be a woman and that she understood Craig to be a cross-dresser.2 8 She compared
Craig to her cousin Edwin, a gay man who had been fired from numerous positions
for his "flaunting" his homosexuality.2 9 Blanche admitted she had a policy against
allowing homosexuals to work at Hudson. 30
Dr. Hage testified that medical science regards an individual's sex as suscep-
tible to placement along a spectrum "ranging from extreme masculinity on the one
hand to extreme femininity on the other ' 31 and that the precise determination is
made after consideration of seven variables, namely, "chromosomal sex, gonadal
sex, hormonal function, internal genital morphology, external genital morphology,
assigned sex ([i.e.,] rearing) and psychosexual differentiation."'32 Dr. Hage de-
fined gender dysphoria, the underlying cause of transsexualism, as a longstanding"compulsion to change anatomic sex"'3 3 and transsexualism itself as gender
dysphoria's manifestation, that is, the "adoption of the desired sex role."' 34 He
then described the procedures required to perform genital sex reassignment, 3 5 and
explained that, given the lack of any psychotherapeutic cure for transsexualism, 36
"[tihese procedures are not properly called sex reassignments but more accurately
sex confirmations.'37 Finally, Hage described Craig as a male-to-female (MTF)
transsexual who, through estrogen therapy, had achieved partial chemical castra-
tion and the growth of breasts, giving her, medically speaking, "[the] external genital
morphology of a female with a hyperextended clitoris." 38 Although Craig had yet
to undergo sex reassignment surgery, Hage deemed her transition from male to
female an unqualified success. 39 Chromosomes, he noted, play very little role in
26. Id. at 2, 3.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2, 3.
31. Affidavit of J. Joris Hage 8, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. Ill. Jan.
9, 1998) (97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created by author for classroom use) (on file with
Maine Law Review) [hereinafter Affidavit]. The testimony of Dr. Hage is a composite of the
writings of various medical professionals on transsexualism. See infra notes 32-40.
32. Affidavit, supra note 31, $ 9..
33. See id. $$ 2, 3, 7. Dr. Hage's definition was taken from Richard Green, Spelling "Relief'
for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination and the Criteria of Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
125, 126 (1985). '
34. Affidavit, supra note 31, 1 3. See William A. W. Walters, Human Sexual Differentiation
and Its Disturbances, in SEX CHANGE: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEX REASSIGNMENT 21 (H.A.
Finlay ed., 1988). The American Psychiatric Association defines gender dysphoria as "[a] per-
sistent aversion toward some or all of those physical characteristics or social roles that connote
one's own biological sex." See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 823 (4th ed., txt. rev. 2000). Gender dysphoria is also known as
gender identity disorder. See id. § 302.85.
35. Affidavit, supra note 31, 15.
36. Id. 17.
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how an individual presents herself to the world and in how she interacts with oth-
ers.40
The last two documents in the file were motions brought after the conclusion
of discovery. Hudson brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that "a
transsexual has no claim for sex discrimination under Title VII" and that, in any
event, there was no material factual dispute that could support such a claim.4 1
Craig brought a motion the same day, asking the court to rule, as a matter of law,
that transsexuals may sue for sex discrimination under Title VII and requesting
summary judgment, given the lack of any material factual disputes regarding ei-
ther her claim or Hudson's defenses. 4 2
B. Craig's Dilemma: Prickly Precedent
For years now, whether transsexuals have alleged discrimination based on
sex, on transsexualism, or on sexual orientation, their claims have failed for one of
several reasons. Some courts have recast transsexualism discrimination claims as
sexual orientation discrimination claims, effectively removing them from the ambit
of federal protection. 43 In certain jurisdictions Where sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is prohibited, courts insist that transsexualism has nothing to do with sexual
orientation. 44 Under these approaches, transsexuals have had no protection against
discrimination on the basis either of their transsexualism or of their sexual orienta-
tion. When she complains of sex discrimination, some courts rule that a trans-
sexual has a viable claim for sex discrimination only if she sues for discrimination
based on her chromosomal sex, something a transsexual, by definition, is unlikely
to do.4 5 Postoperative transsexuals' anatomical sex and preoperative transsexuals'
gender are often entirely disregarded, because courts are convinced that legisla-
tures, when they enacted antidiscrimination legislation, had only a very narrow
and traditional definition of sex in mind.46
The Craig case is a composite of factors deemed legally significant by appel-
late courts ruling on discrimination claims brought by transsexuals. Craig's di-
lemma, as a transsexual bringing a Title VII violation claim, was that numerous
40. Id. I 11. It should be noted that Hage did not describe Craig's chromosomal make-up and
that Craig admitted she did not know what it was. Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 5. Hage
did, though, attest that "[n]ew discoveries point to the fallacy in concluding that the presence of
a Y chromosome as a distinct entity seen on conventional chromosome analysis is essential for
the diagnosis of maleness." Affidavit, supra note 31, $ 11.
41. Notice of Motion and Motion of Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. $ 1, Craig v. Hudson
Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. I11. Jan. 22, 1998) (97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created
by author for classroom use) (on file with Maine Law Review).
42. Notice of Motion and Motion of June G. Craig 11 2, 3, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Com-
pressor Co. (C.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1998) (97 Civ. 3384) (fictional document created by author for
classroom use) (on file with Maine Law Review).
43. See infra note 48.
44. See Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.YS.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Underwood
v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
45. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disag-
gregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1995) (explaining the immutability of
gender for transgendered persons).
46. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
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hurdles in the form of adverse appellate rulings stood between her and a judgment
in her favor. The majority of these rulings, at both the federal and state levels,
have denied transsexuals the protection of sex and sexual orientation discrimina-
tion proscriptions. 47 These cases illustrate how courts routinely miscategorize
transsexualism as a matter of sexual orientation, confuse the physiological bases
upon which one's legal sex is said to be based, misunderstand the relation between
sex and gender, and give employers' perceptions of their employees' gender iden-
tities determinative importance without explanation and without attention to the
remedial nature of antidiscrimination legislation.
Many early decisions concluded that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion does not prohibit discrimination based on transsexualism, since transsexualism
is a type of sexual orientation. 48 Moreover, since Congress has rejected several
bills introduced to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference, 49 the judiciary has concluded that, by implication,50 discrimination on
47. The minority position advanced by the New York courts is discussed infra notes 53-57
and accompanying text. Some antidiscrimination legislation, namely, the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and certain state statutes expressly exclude trans-
sexuals from their purview. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1)
(2002); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) (1994); IND. CODE § 22-9-5-6(d)(3) (West, WESTLAW through
end of 2002 1st Spec. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 225C.46(2)(b) (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:2232(11)(b) (West, WESTLAW through 2001 Reg. and 2nd Ex. Sess. Acts 1996); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102(9) (West, WESTLAW through end of 2002 1st Spec. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.01 (16)(b)(ii) (West, WESTLAW through 124th GA (2002)). A discussion of these
statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
48. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F2d at 1084; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d
at 750; Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'g 403 F. Supp.
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.
1977) (overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000))
("The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic
and language of Price Waterhouse."); Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., 538 F2d
319 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'g No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 897 (1976); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (noting that
the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is that discrimination against
transsexuals is not prohibited by existing law).
49. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F2d at 1085-86 (enumerating unsuccessful attempts by
members of Congress to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based upon "affectational or
sexual orientation"). Several courts have determined that discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference is not prohibited by Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. E.g., Williamson v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). Legislation introduced in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1999 also
failed. Tiffany L. King, Working Out: Conflicting Title VII Approaches to Sex Discrimination
and Sexual Orientation, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1005, 1024 (2002). The latest version of this
legislation was introduced in 2001. See Human Rights Campaign, Congressional Legislation:
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), available at http://capwiz.com/hrc/issues/bills/
?bill=46908 (last visited October 21, 2002).
50. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F2d at 1086 (using Congress's rejection of attempts
to broaden the scope of Title VII as evidence that it "had a narrow view of sex in mind when it
passed the Civil Rights Act"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d at 750 ("The fact that
the proposals were defeated indicates that the word 'sex' in Title VII is to be given its traditional
definition, rather than an expansive interpretation."); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
F.2d at 662 (failure to add sexual orientation shows "that Congress had only the traditional
notions of 'sex' in mind") (overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F3d at 1201).
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the basis of sex must not encompass discrimination on the basis of transsexualism.5 1
This categorical denial of claims alleging discrimination based on transsexualism
appears inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of antidiscrimination legis-
lation.52
In jurisdictions where employment discrimination statutes include sexual ori-
entation as a prohibited basis for discrimination, courts have concluded that
transsexualism is not a form of sexual orientation. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry,
Inc.,5 3 for example, the transsexual plaintiff argued that her claim was actionable
due to the inclusion of sexual orientation in the New York City equivalent of Title
VII.54 The court rejected this theory, noting "[t]here is a clear distinction between
homosexuals and transsexuals." 55 The court disagreed with the notion that the
failure of Congress to include the term "sexual orientation" 56 in Title VII demon-
strated its intent to exclude transsexuals. 57 In support of its determination, the
court cited Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc.,58 a case brought
under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act,59 in which the court held that
transsexuality and homosexuality are distinct.60 Similarly, in Enriquez v. West
Jersey Health Systems, Inc.,6 1 responding to plaintiff's claim that she had been
discriminated against based on her sexual orientation, the court made a sharp dis-
tinction between transsexualism and sexual orientation. 62 "This portion of the
statute," it declared, "refers to one's relations with others and not to his or her
51. But see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 48-49 (1995)
(noting that a strict construction of the statute supports protection for transsexuals routinely
appearing for work in women's attire, "if the skirts and dresses were of a sort the employer did
not object to its female employees wearing"); RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS,
AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 108 (1996) (arguing that since the word transsexual
refers to one's sex, discrimination on this basis is sex discrimination); Jennifer Levi, Paving the
Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 5, 28 n. 146 (2000) (quoting Commission des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de
la Jeunesse v. Maison des Jeunes, Canada Province of Quebec, [1998] [Human Rights Tribunal
File No. 500-53-00078-970, at 21 ] ("[I]t is not clear how discrimination based on transsexualism
or on the process of transsexualism could be anything other than sex-based.")).
52. United Steelworkers of Am., 443 U.S. 193, 215 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (not-
ing "the broad remedial purposes of Title VII").
53. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
54. N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107, 1(a) (West, WESTLAW through 2001).
55. Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
56. The court's definition of "sexual orientation" was: "sexual preferences and practices,
i.e., the sex of a person's sexual partner, with heterosexuals being persons sexually attracted to
members of the opposite sex, homosexuals being those attracted to members of the same sex,
and bisexuals attracted to both sexes." Id. at 393.
57. Id. at 395-96 ("Because Congress may have chosen not to include the term 'sexual orien-
tation' in Title VII does not mean that it has considered and declined coverage to transsexuals.").
58. 857 F Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
59. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
60. Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. at 98 (noting incorrectly that"courts have firmly distinguished transsexuality from homosexuality").
61. 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
62. Id. at 372.
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sexual identity *... ",63
Perhaps aware that she could not bring a claim for discrimination based on her
transsexualism, 64 Craig chose to sue Hudson for sex discrimination. While courts
clearly stated that transsexuals may assert claims of discrimination based on their
sex, 65 these courts typically define a preoperative transsexual's sex as her ana-
tomical sex and a postoperative transsexual's sex as her chromosomal sex, effec-
tively rendering gender identity or any "change" of sex irrelevant to a threshold
determination of her sex and a lawsuit for sex discrimination by any transsexual an
exercise in futility.6 6 At the same time, these courts, apparently aware that few
employers inspect the genitalia or chromosomal make-up of their employees at
any point in the employment relationship, render the employers' perceptions of the
employees' sex determinative. 67 This creates an incentive for employers who be-
come aware of the transition after the claim is brought to assert that it was known
or suspected that the employee was not the sex she claims to be. This is an effec-
tive obstacle against sex discrimination claims brought by transsexuals, since a
transsexual is highly unlikely to sue for sex discrimination against males if her
gender identity is female. The clear result of this quandary is that transsexuals
cannot advance viable claims under antidiscrimination laws.
The most salient problem in the legal treatment of sex discrimination claims
brought by transsexuals is the great inconsistency between the legal and medical
determination of sex. While most in the medical establishment accept that sex
determination requires consideration of a multiplicity of factors that enable place-
63. Id. at 371. But see EVANSTON, ILL., ORDINANCE 61-0-97 (1997), available at http://
66.1 13.113.195.234/IL/Evanston/07005000000006000.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (defin-
ing sexual orientation in Human Rights Ordinance as encompassing both affectional relation-
ships and gender identity); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., MUNICIPAL CODE § 139.10, 139.20, available at
http://fws.municode.com/CGI-BIN/OMisapi.dll?infobase= 11490.nfo&softpage=
newtestTOCnonFrame (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
affectional preference and including within the definition of affectional preference "having or
projecting a self-image not associated with one's biological maleness or one's biological fe-
maleness").
64. Transsexuals, in any event, identify as either male or female. See THOMAS LATHROP STEDMAN,
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1841 (27th ed. 2000) (defining transsexualism as "[t]he desire
to change one's anatomic sexual characteristics to conform physically with one's perception of
self as a member of the opposite sex").
65. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)
("[T]ranssexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would clearly
state a cause of action under Title VII.") (overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th.Cir. 2000)); Cox v. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999 WL
1317785, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999).66. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We agree with the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits that if the term 'sex' as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than
biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from Congress."); Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (overruling recognized by
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d at 1201). See also James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995) (granting summary judgment against an MTF who failed to
allege discrimination against males).
67. See, e.g., James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 481 (granting summary
judgment against an MTF who failed to allege discrimination against males); Dobre v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (denying an MTF redress where
the employer did not perceive the MTF to be female).
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ment of sex along a continuum, 68 the legal establishment, by contrast, insists that
sex is a simple matter of biology, anatomy, or chromosomes. 69 Where these crite-
ria point.to different sexes, 70 the court hearing the matter chooses whichever crite-
rion will most damage the viability of a transsexual's sex discrimination claim. 7 1
By way of justification, courts claim that, in the interest of administrative effi-
ciency and predictable outcomes, such a cut-and-dry approach to sex determina-
tion is necessary.7 2 Ironically, however, this legal approach to sex determination
is itself merely borrowed from medicine. 73 In essence, then, in such cases the
judiciary is not disregarding or refuting medical authority, but is instead engaging
in selective use of the criteria medicine deems relevant to the determination of sex.
Ulane provides an illustration of the quandary faced by transsexuals suing for
sex discrimination. The Seventh Circuit ruled that Ulane had alleged the impos-
sible: since her chromosomal patterns had not been and could not be surgically
altered, and since sex reassignment surgery had failed to endow her with a uterus
or ovaries,74 there simply was no factual basis upon which to proceed with her
claim that Eastern had discriminated against her because she was a woman.7 5
68. See Erwin K. Koranyi, Transsexuality Revisited, 16 AUSTL. J. OF FORENSIC SC. 34, 37
(1983) ("Sex of a person-a simple 'yes' or 'no' before-was broken down by Science to chro-
mosomal sex, nuclear sex, hormonal sex, gonadal sex, and gender sex-to the dismay of courts,
finding scientists in argument over as 'simple' a question as whether the subject is male or
female."); Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub, Introduction to BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLI-
TICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 1, 20 [hereinafter BODY GUARDS] (Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub
eds., 1991) ("The notion of a 'natural' continuum along which sexual differentiation subtly
occurs derives ... from the earliest biomedical explanations in Western discourse."); Henry
Finlay, Legal Recognition of Transsexuals in Australia, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 503,
517 (1996):
It appears that the simplistic biblical dichotomy between the sexes may now, in the
light of modem insights, have to give way to a bipolar model of human sexuality.
Along the continuum linking the two archetypal extremes are the various intermedi-
ate "abnormalities" that diverge, in greater or lesser degree, from the norm.
Id.; Stefano Rodota, General Presentation of Problems Related to Transsexualism, in
TRANSSEXUALISM, MEDICINE AND LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXIIIRD COLLOQUY ON EUROPEAN LAW,
17, 19 (1995); William A. W. Walters, Transsexualism-Medical and Legal Aspects, 16 AUSTL. J.
OF FORENSIC SCI. 65, 65 (1983). "[T]he concept has developed of a spectrum of sexuality ranging
from extreme masculinity on one hand to extreme femininity on the other." Id. "Seven vari-
ables are thought to be involved in determination of sexual identity, viz., chromosomal sex,
gonadal sex, hormonal function, internal genital morphology, external genital morphology, as-
signed sex (rearing) and psychosexual differentiation." Id. at 69.
69. E.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,749 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Plaintiff, for the
purposes of Title VII, is male because she is an anatomical male. This fact is not disputed. As
the Court accepts the biological fact as the basis for determining sex, the Court finds that entry
of summary judgment is appropriate."); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 E2d at 1083 nn.5-6,
1087.
70. BODY GUARDS, supra note 68, at 3 ("[B]iological sex is ... labile, as its chromosomal,
gonadal, and secondary determinants may contest with each other.").
71. Naturally, in cases of intersexed individuals, these criteria will not point to either male or
female. In such individuals, sex remains ambiguous as an anatomical and a chromosomal mat-
ter. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Be-
tween Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265,281-92 (1999).
72. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1084.
73. See id. at 1083 n.6.
74. See id. at 1083 nn.5-6.
75. Id. at 1087.
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Whatever womanhood Ulane had adopted was, to the court, purely superficial. It
saw Ulane as "a biological male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and
has surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear to be female." 76 Medical
authority was, apparently, not to the contrary. "[S]ome in the medical profession,"
remarked the court, "conclude that hormone treatments and sex reassignment sur-
gery can alter the evident makeup of an individual, but cannot change the
individual's innate sex."'77 Ulane's chromosomal approach to sex discrimination
inspired its famous declaration that "it is unlawful to discriminate against women
because they are women and against men because they are men." 78 On these terms,
June Craig's lawsuit was less than promising.
Other courts, embracing the reasoning of Ulane, were convinced that Title VII
was meant to prohibit sex discrimination based only on the anatomical characteris-
tics which divide organisms into males and females. 7 9 This restrictive vision of
sex discrimination would seem not to prohibit gender stereotyping, which focuses
more on secondary sex characteristics than it does on anatomy or, at the very least,
recognizes that one's behavior may conflict with societal expectations of one's
anatomical sex. Moreover, the focus on anatomy appears to be what prevents Title
VII's sex discrimination provisions from being used to combat sexual orientation
discrimination. 80 In Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission,8 1 for example,
the plaintiff's theory was that, "because the legislature prohibited discrimination
based on 'sex,' rather than on 'male or female sex,' it left open the possibility of
prohibiting discrimination against persons with attributes of both sexes." 82 The
federal district court in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.8 3 accused Sommers of
engaging in semantic manipulation and granted the defendant summary judgment. 84
Perhaps most critical to the survival of Craig's claim was information about
what Hudson knew about her transsexualism when they terminated her employ-
ment. Courts have invariably rendered references to the public's perception of
transsexual plaintiffs' sexual identities and past choices to undergo sex reassign-
ment determinative of the outcome in discrimination cases. In dismissing Karen
Ulane's claim, for example, the court made clear that her past could not be dis-
carded, no matter what interventions had taken place, "even if one believes that a
woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man. ... 85 In Holloway,
the court noted that an official of the company believed Holloway "would be hap-
pier at a new job where her transsexualism would be unknown."'86 Ironically,
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1083 n.6 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1085.
79. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Giving the
statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of'sex' in mind.") (overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir.
2000)).
80. See id.
81. 337 N.W.2d 470,473-74 (Iowa 1983).
82. Id.
83. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 749.
85. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977) (overruling recog-
nized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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these factors explain why transsexuals bring discrimination suits to begin with; a
transsexual who "passes" and whose past identity and choice to undergo reassign-
ment are unknown is less likely to face sex discrimination targeting her appear-
ance and behavior. Moreover, if she suffers disparate treatment because of her
anatomical sex, the defense of transsexualism may never occur to the defendants.
Transsexuals like Holloway who begin sex reassignment while employed or, like
Ulane, whose past life as the opposite sex is known, by contrast, quickly discover
that courts will allow defendants to use these factors to reframe the issues pre-
sented and, ultimately, to undermine their claims. 87 This judicial treatment of
transsexuals' discrimination claims gives employers a powerful weapon against a
transsexual plaintiff's ability to carry her burden of proof.
Craig was both like and unlike the cases where public perceptions and knowl-
edge of pasts held sway. For one thing, Craig had begun sex reassignment before
she started working at Hudson, and none of her coworkers appeared to have known
Craig before she began her transition. Her appearance, then, did not change from
the time she began work until she was terminated. Furthermore, the facts sug-
gested she had always represented herself as female. The issue, then, became how
she had been perceived by others-her coworkers certainly but, more important,
Hudson. Hudson's story was that she had suspected for quite some time that Craig
was an anatomical male and a transsexual and that when Craig asked for time off,
Hudson knew instantly it was for the purpose of undergoing sex reassignment
surgery. 88 Some of the facts supported this theory. Hudson testified, for example,
that she had received reports from Craig's alarmed female coworkers that Craig
was "standing up" when using the women's restroom. Other facts, however, seemed
to contradict Hudson's version of the facts. In her deposition, for instance, Hudson
betrayed her view that transsexuals, homosexuals, and transvestites were one and
the same. 89 Although Hudson's advocates argued that her confusion was irrel-
evant, given that none of these classes of individuals is protected by Title VII,
Craig's advocates insisted that Hudson's confusion called her account of Craig's
discharge into question and that, moreover, her inconsistent use of masculine and
feminine pronouns to refer to Craig cast doubt on her story of having suspected
Craig was male all along. Craig's advocates emphasized these inconsistencies in
Hudson's testimony, and also flagged the contradictions between Hudson's and
Craig's stories. Craig and her medical expert both explained how Craig's chemi-
cal castration as a result of hormone therapy made it impossible for her to use the
restroom standing up, and Craig described her being scrutinized in the restroom by
women she suspected were lesbian.90
Over the last several years, some courts have taken transsexuals' discrimina-
tion claims seriously. Starting with Maffei in 1995 and continuing to the present, a
87. See generally Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); see Dobre v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (plaintiff hired as man began sex
reassignment; court held plaintiff had no case unless employer considered her to be female);
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470,471 (Iowa 1983) (plaintiff hired hav-
ing already begun sex reassignment; discharged after being recognized by someone from her
pre-sex-reassignment past).
88. Hudson Deposition, supra note 23, at 2 ("[I]t just clicked.").
89. See id. at 3.
90. Craig Deposition, supra note 9, at 2.
2002]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
few courts have been willing to allow sex discrimination claims brought by trans-
sexuals to go forward. In perhaps the most easily understood of these cases, Miles
v. New York University,9 1 a student brought a Title IX action against the university
arising from incidents of sexual harassment by a male professor.92 The plaintiff
had been admitted to the university as a female, but, unbeknownst to all, she was a
preoperative male-to-female transsexual undergoing hormone therapy to become
a woman.9 3 The court held that Title IX covers discriminatory conduct suffered
by a biological male who was always perceived to be a female. 94 The court re-
marked, "There is no conceivable reason why such conduct should be rewarded
with legal pardon just because ... plaintiff was not a biological female."'95 The
court further stated that Titles IX and VII are to be interpreted similarly; thus, the
same standards apply to cases brought under either congressional Act.96 Miles is
certainly encouraging, but it, like so many Title VII cases, makes the employer's
perceptions of the plaintiff's sex determinative and leaves unclear to what extent
the plaintiff's gender identity is relevant.97
Employment discrimination proscriptions in both the state and city of New
York,98 which have been interpreted more broadly than Title VII,9 9 comport in
large measure with the common sense and liberal constructionist approaches of
Miles and Enriquez, with the result that transsexuals have had greater success there
in advancing their sex discrimination claims. Courts in New York have found the
federal cases "unduly restrictive"' 100 in light of the "'overwhelming medical evi-
dence"' 10 1 that transsexuals become their psychological sex once sex reassign-
ment is complete. Shifting the emphasis from the fact of reassignment to
reassignment's results, an approach that would have resulted in an actionable sex
discrimination claim for Karen Ulane, the court in Maffei entertained a postopera-
tive female-to-male transsexual's (FTM) hostile work environment discrimination
claim. 10 2 The court concluded that a postoperative transsexual assumes a differ-
ent sex and can sue for sexual harassment in the same way that nontranssexuals
can when ridiculed for their secondary sexual characteristics. 10 3
In Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems,104 another case brought under the New York
and the New York City equivalents of Title VII, a preoperative MTF's employment
was terminated after she advised her employer that she needed time off to undergo
sex conversion surgery. 105 The court determined that Rentos had alleged a color-
91. 979 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 248.
94. Id. at 250.
95. Id. at 249.
96. See id. at 249-50.
97. Cf. Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (statingthat an MTF could not bring a claim for discrimination on basis of being female unless the
employer perceived the MTF to be female).
98. See N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1) (1996). One court has remarked that the substitu-tion of "gender" for "sex" in the ordinance suggests the two are distinct. Maffei v. KolaetonIndus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
99. Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 394-96.
100. Id. at 394.
101. Id. at 395.
102. Id. at 396.
103. Id.
104. No. CIV. 95-7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996).
105. Id. at *2.
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able claim of sex discrimination under the state and city human rights laws. 106
The court noted that Rentos, in what could be termed a semantic coup, had assidu-
ously tracked the language in Maffei, "quotation marks and all," in framing the
issues of her claim. 107
Cases applying state and municipal law have been even more encouraging. In
Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 10 8 for example, the plaintiff Enriquez, a
pediatrician in an outpatient clinic, began her gradual external transformation from
male to female after her employment commenced. 10 9 Her superiors grew increas-
ingly uncomfortable with this transformation and asked that she return to her pre-
vious appearance.1 10 When she did not, she received a termination letter giving a
different reason for her discharge. 111 The clinic informed some of Enriquez's
patients that she had disappeared. 112 In response to Enriquez's suit charging, among
other things, gender discrimination, the trial court granted summary judgment to
the clinic. 113 The appellate court reversed the summary judgment as to the gender
discrimination count. 114 After surveying federal and state law on the issue, the
court stated its disagreement with the majority position expounded in Ulane and
concluded that allowing transsexuals to bring claims of gender discrimination "is
more closely connected to our own state's historic policy of liberally construing
[antidiscrimination legislation]."' 115 It made no sense to the court that New Jersey
law would forbid sexuality discrimination and gender stereotyping but would ex-
clude from protection those whose transsexualism compels them to change their
anatomical sex. 116
Although courts purport to welcome such claims if transsexuals allege dis-
crimination on the basis of their anatomical sex prior to sex reassignment,
preoperatives and postoperatives are, in the main, psychologically incapable of
doing this. 117 The realm of nonliability thus created for employers is total: under
Dobre v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,118 employers who hire transsexuals
prior to sex reassignment can easily claim that the employees were perceived to be
their anatomical sex; 119 under Sommers, in the case of postoperatives, the discov-
106. See id. at *1.
107. Id. at *9.
108. 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
109. Id. at 368.
110. Id.
101. Id.
112. Id. at 369.
113. Id. at 370.
114. See id. at 373.
113. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disag-
gregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 35 (1995) ("According to the traditional
view, the sexed body---one's inside-is immutable, whereas gender identity--one's outside-is
mutable. Yet for the transgendered person, the sexed body--one's outside-is regarded as mu-
table while one's gendered identity---one's inside-is experienced as immutable."). But see
Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (FTM postoperative as-
serted his chromosomal sexual identity enabled him to disclaim responsibility for providing
child support for his adopted children, since under the law he could not be the father of the
children by virtue of being female).
118. 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
119. See id. at 287.
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ery of the fact of sex reassignment is enough to create dispositive perceptions on
the part of employers that the employee is in fact a member of the opposite sex. 120
The result curiously not only requires plaintiffs to prove that they were perceived
to be the sex upon the basis of which they claim discrimination, but rests as well on
the assumption that discrimination never occurs unless the perpetrator actively
perceives the person to be the sex she wishes to discriminate against.
As I have stated in a previous article:
Perhaps the best, and as yet untested approach to these types of claims, then,
would be to advance transsexuals' discrimination claims upon two theories, one
for discrimination based on one sex, and another for discrimination based on the
other sex. The judiciary, though, already gifted with an impressive track record
of beating back transsexuals' claims of employment discrimination via a dis-
course scripted with semantic manipulation, may well already be endowed with
the rhetorical wherewithal to continue its campaign of exclusion in response to
this new strategy. 121
These enlightened approaches to discrimination against transsexuals were not
applicable to Craig's case. Following federal precedents, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co., concluding
both that as a matter of law transsexuals have no claim for sex discrimination
under Title VII and that even if they did, the facts alleged by Craig revealed no
genuine issues of material fact for trial. 122 The trial court based this second con-
clusion on four factual findings. First, the trial court found that Craig was a man
who, "while employed at Hudson, insisted on wearing women's clothing to work,
claimed to be married to another man, and insisted on using the women's
restroom." 12 3 Second, the trial court found that "[tihe contrast between plaintiff's
sex and his behavior made other workers at Hudson uncomfortable and created a
volatile and explosive atmosphere in the workplace." 124 Third, the trial court found
that Craig's "deep voice, masculine mannerisms and unfeminine gait confirmed to
Hudson that [Craig] was either a transsexual or a homosexual transvestite." 12 5
Fourth, the trial court found that "Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co.'s policy is
not to employ homosexuals or transsexuals." 126 In its memorandum of law, the
trial court remarked, "Plaintiff's lifestyle choices are his own; however, employers
are not required by law to countenance flagrant homosexuality, transsexuality and
transvestism in the workplace. '12 7
C. The Lessons of Advocacy
Students' reaction to the Craig case was predictably mixed. I had admittedly-
and in retrospect intentionally-violated a central tenet of legal writing pedagogy
120. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1981).
121. Naming, supra note 2, at 324.
122. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Memorandum in Craig v.
Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (C.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1998) (97 Cir. 3384) [hereinafter Findings]
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by writing an unbalanced problem. My goal in doing so was to inspire students to
think creatively in designing new approaches to legal problems. But in this too I
had failed. The students representing Hudson were only too pleased to rely un-
questioningly upon the arsenal of appellate precedents opposed to any claim of
discrimination Craig might bring. The students representing Craig, in contrast,
were inspired to think creatively about Craig's dilemma and, with some prompt-
ing, used the nascent gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination on her be-
half. The stark contrast in their approaches to advocacy reflected the classic di-
lemma of what posture a court should assume when responding to any legal prob-
lem-one hewing unerringly to stare decisis at all costs or one allowing the law
some elasticity to respond to public policies that shift in response to unforeseen
problems. 128
Mid-semester, Craig's advocates faced an unexpected-and an unwelcomed-
challenge. Just after the students began work on the appellate brief, the Supreme
Court, in the wake of its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,129
vacated and remanded the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe v. City of Belleville,130
in which the plaintiffs had successfully marshaled Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins13 1
to convince the court that they had suffered sex discrimination by means of gender
stereotyping. 1 3 2 The mood among advocates for Craig was understandably dour
at this turn of events, given the paucity of other precedent in support of Craig's
claim. Just as has occurred recently in the courts, 133 there was much debate about
the effect of the vacation in light of Oncale134 on Doe's reasoning. Many students
chose to continue to rely on Doe, concluding that the Supreme Court vacated the
decision to disapprove of the Seventh Circuit's sex per se approach to causation (to
which Oncale specifically refers) 135 and not to disapprove of the gender stereo-
typing theory of discrimination which Oncale ignores. Other students, mindful of
the legal meaning of vacation, 136 chose to abandon references to Doe and to present
128. This tension is one of the most basic aspects of the law first-year students learn about in
their legal methods courses. For an example of the tension, see Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), reprinted in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19-23 (5th ed.
2002).
129. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
130. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
131. 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
132. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 596-97.
133. See discussion supra Part II.B.
134. City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998), vacating and remanding 119 F.3d 563
(7th Cir. 1997).
135. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("Still others
suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of
the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or motivations.") (citing Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997)).
136. "To vacate is '[t]o render an act void; as, to vacate an entry of record, or a judgment."'
Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609, 614 n.8 (Md. 2002) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388
(5th ed. 1979)). "'Vacate'... means 'to render inoperative; deprive of validity; void; annul.' An
order to vacate only wipes the slate clean, leaving the next outcome uncertain, absent other
direction." NLRB v. Goodless Bros. Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 102, 110 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2100 (2d. ed. 1997). "To vacate something
is to destroy it, to eliminate it, to render it a nullity .... Vacation ... is a remedy usually
employed when some error or accident makes the continued existence of [an) order undesir-
able." Meekins v. Dept. of Insts., Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 554 P.2d 872, 875 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976). "A judgment which is vacated is destroyed in its entirety upon the entry of the order that
the judgment be vacated .... " Krummel v. Hintz, 222 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
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Price Waterhouse alone as authoritative-and binding-precedent in support of a
gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. Many of Craig's advocates be-
lieved their case, built of necessity upon a Supreme Court decision never before
applied in a case brought by a transsexual and upon a lower court decision not
applying Title VII, 137 was slim indeed. But the facts of the case made a strong
effort appear worthwhile. After all, it was not at all clear what Blanche knew
about Craig's gender prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. When she hired
Craig, she was looking for a "girl" for the assembly line, and she objected to Craig's
unfeminine attire in the same way she objected to her sister Jane's similar attire. 138
According to this theory of the case, there appeared to have been no time when
Blanche believed Craig to be other than female. Furthermore, even if a court
believed that the alleged restroom incidents were dispositive, summary judgment
was still inappropriate because Blanche's testimony on that point was directly re-
futed by Craig's. Finally, if Blanche believed Craig was a masculine female all
along, Miles suggested Craig's lawsuit was viable, and Price suggested she could
prevail on a gender stereotyping theory.
Naturally, Hudson was fully prepared to rebut these characterizations of the
facts. Blanche had initially believed Craig to be female but had gradually reached
the conclusion that she was a transsexual. It was not until Craig asked for time off
that "it just clicked" that Craig was somehow deviant. 139 The competing accounts
of Craig's employment at Hudson made summary judgment seem less than appro-
priate. 140 Nonetheless, Hudson held a well grounded hope that the court hearing
Craig's appeal would simply apply the appellate precedents disallowing all em-
ployment discrimination claims brought by transsexuals and affirm the judgment
below.
III. GENDER STEREOTYPING
The Craig case left unanswered the question of whether the gender stereotyp-
ing theory of sex discrimination could bolster the discrimination claims of trans-
sexuals. The theory had its genesis in the lower courts1 41 and was recognized by
the Supreme Court before reaching "its most mature stage"' 142 in Price
Waterhouse.143 The theory then lay dormant for several years. Most surprisingly,
effeminate men discovered they were foreclosed from invoking the theory, since
courts invariably equated their effeminacy with homosexuality and reiterated that
Title VII does not proscribe sexual orientation discrimination. 144 A case decided
137. See Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
138. Id.
139. Hudson Deposition, supra note 23, at 2.
140. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Plain Meaning ofOncale, 7 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913,
931 (1999); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harass-
ment, 61 U. PrrT. L. REv. 671, 710 n.180 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971); Will-
iams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976).
142. Franke, infra note 148, at 169.
143. See id. at 166 n.9 (citing decisions); see also id. at 169.
144. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979), abrogated insofar as inconsistent with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins; Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938
(5th Cir. 1979).
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in 1997 by the Seventh Circuit, Doe v. City of Belleville,145 validated a claim of
gender stereoptyping brought by a gender atypical male but was swiftly vacated
by the Supreme Court just after its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc. 14 6 An examination of the circumstances under which Doe was vacated
and a close reading of the language of Oncale sheds light both on the continuing
viability of gender stereotyping claims in general and on their usefulness to
transgender plaintiffs in particular.
A. Vacating Doe
The discussion of gender stereotyping in the appellate briefs in the Craig case
raises the questions, first, how it functions as a theory of sex discrimination and,
second, how availing it could be to transsexual or transgendered employees dis-
criminated against at work. 147 Considering the theory, one advocate for Hudson
wrote:
Even if gender stereotyping were [a] ... theory under which to file a discrimina-
tion suit, it would not be applicable in the present fact situation. In Craig's case,
Craig was not discriminated against for failing to fit the stereotype of her sex.
Craig perceived herself to be female and acted accordingly .... From Craig's
standpoint, she did not fail to act according to her sex because she considered
herself to be female. From the perspective of Hudson, Craig was fired because
she was a biological male who wanted to undergo sex reassignment surgery. When
looked at from either perspective, gender stereotyping does not play any role. 14 8
In Doe, coworkers subjected brothers H. and J. Doe to verbal abuse and threats
of rape. 14 9 H., who wore an earring, received the brunt of the abuse, which prima-
145. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
146. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
147. Gender identity is "the usually unshakable conviction of being male or female." Rich-
ard Green, M.D., Childhood Cross-Gender Identification, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REAS-
SIGNMENT 23, 26 (Richard Green, M.D. & John Money, Ph.D. eds., 1969). Gender expression is
the outward manifestation of gender identity. GENDER EDUCATION & ADVOCACY INC., GENDER
VARIANCE: A PRIMER (2001), available at http://www.gender.org/resources/dge/gea01004.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002). "Transgendered" is a term meant to include all "individuals whose
gendered self-presentation (evidenced through dress, mannerisms, and even physiology) does
not correspond to the behaviors habitually associated with the members of their biological sex."
VIVIANE K. NAMASTE, INVISIBLE LIVES: THE ERASURE OF TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE
1 (2000). Not all transgendered individuals are transsexual. Transsexuals are individuals who
wish to conform their bodies to their gender identity and, by way of transition, take hormones or
submit to surgery to do so. Some transgendered individuals, though, live as the opposite gender
but do not take hormones or have surgery. GENDER EDUCATION & ADVOCACY INC., supra.
148. Brief for Appellee at 15, Craig v. Hudson Airtool & Compressor Co. (7th Cir. 1988)
(No. 98 Civ. 584) (fictional document created by author for classroom use) (on file with Maine
Law Review). It is doubtful that if Hudson believed Craig to be a male who dressed too mascu-
linely, Craig could have prevailed on a gender stereotyping theory, for this would constitute
neither reward for conforming to unfounded stereotypes nor punishment for failing to conform
to them. See Katherine M. Franke, Amicus Curiae Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund and Equal Rights Advocates in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and in Support of Reversal
in the United States Court ofAppeals for the First Circuit Lucas Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust
Co. on Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 163, 168 (2001); but see Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway:
Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
283, 301 (1997) (implying a too feminine Hopkins would certainly have a claim).
149. 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
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rily focused on his gender and sexual orientation. 150 He was called a "fag" and a"queer" by his coworkers, and was asked whether he was a man or a woman. 15 1
One of H.'s coworkers repeatedly threatened to rape him, and was encouraged to
do so by other coworkers. 152 This same coworker eventually cornered H. and
placed his hand on H.'s genitals to confirm that H. was male. 15 3 The district court
ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that the Does suffered sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, not sex discrimination. 154 The court also implied that the
conduct suffered by the Does was nonsexual, since the Does testified that they
were never sexually propositioned. 155
Reversing, the Seventh Circuit made two important points regarding proof in
sexual harassment cases. First, the court declared conduct of a sexual nature di-
rected at the plaintiff to be per se because of the plaintiff's sex.156 Second, the
court validated the use of facts showing gender stereotyping to support a claim of
sex discrimination brought by a gender-atypical male. 157 The court cited Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins as authority for its reasoning 158 and expressed disagree-
ment with the decisions of other courts that have ruled that men discriminated
against for exhibiting nonconforming gender traits have no claim of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. 159 In so doing, the court aligned itself with the very few
courts that have allowed such claims to go forward. 160 The court was less specific
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 567.
153. Id. The facts of Doe are the basis of a sexual harassment hypothetical in MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
582 (5th ed. 2000).
154. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 567-68.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 568-69, 576-77, 580 (characterizing the charged conduct as sexual in nature and
focused on H.'s gender).
157. See id. at 568-69; see also id. at 581 (asserting that a man is sexually harassed when his
masculinity is called into question by coworkers and finding support for the Does' claim in the
fact that H. Doe was harassed for not conforming to male standards).
158. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding that stereotyped re-
marks may evidence gender discrimination). Jennifer Levi has characterized Price Waterhouse
as establishing "the legal principle that sex stereotyping is an impermissible form of sex dis-
crimination." Jennifer Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to Secur-
ing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 22-23 (2000).
159. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 582 (distinguishing Rathert v. Village of
Peotone, 903 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989)); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979), abrogated insofar as inconsistent with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins; Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
160. See, e.g., Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc., No. 96-1322-JTM, 1997 WL 157126, at *5 (D.
Kan. Mar. 20, 1997) (ruling that same-sex harassment is actionable when it takes the form of
remarks implying that a man working in a traditionally female position is homosexual); Lindahl
v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "sex stereotyping can be evi-
dence of sex discrimination"); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971) ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women result-
ing from sex stereotypes."); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting
that, although Congress did want to eliminate discrimination based on sexual stereotypes, it also
wished to forbid any discrimination based on sex); Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131,
134 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (finding that a same-sex harassment claim based on gender
stereotyping was cognizable).
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with regard to distinguishing between actionable harassment and innocuous, if
repugnant, horseplay, concluding merely that distinguishing between the two was
a matter of "common sense."' 16 1 This assessment anticipated the Supreme Court's
adoption of a similar "common sense" standard in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. 16 2
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe was a significant departure from prior
decisions on same-sex sexual harassment in two primary respects. First, the Sev-
enth Circuit did not require consideration of whether similar treatment by the ha-
rasser of the opposite sex would constitute sexual harassment.163 Second, the
court refused to tie same-sex sexual harassment claims to the harasser's sexual
attraction to the victim. 164 Doe, in contrast to prior decisions, posited that unwel-
come sexual conduct in the workplace is deeply humiliating and is proscribed for
the simple reason that it is tied in some way to gender. 16 5 The court asserted that,
where sexual harassment is of an explicitly sexual nature, the male plaintiff need
not offer proof that his gender motivated the harasser and that a similarly situated
female worker would not have been harassed. 166 In seeking to define the ambit of
proscribed sexual conduct, the court included invasions of sexual privacy and re-
marks related to gender, even if such conduct did not constitute an overt sexual
advance. 167 Doe ventured further than any other decision in analyzing fully the
various concerns raised by same-sex cases, and it offered the most controversial
analytical paradigm of these cases to date. 16 8 In this regard, it was a landmark
ruling with far-reaching implications for Title VII jurisprudence. It is thus not
surprising that the Supreme Court, after granting certiorari in this case, 169 vacated
the decision and remanded it to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of
Oncale.170 For its part, Oncale confirmed that same-sex sexual harassment is
cognizable as sex discrimination and described three methods of proving sex dis-
crimination: (1) sexual advances; (2) animus; or (3) comparative evidence show-
Scholars agree with this theory of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the
Gendered Politics of Identity: Who Owns the Label "Lesbian?," 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22
(1997); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187, 188, 232; Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim
of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992); Valdes, infra note 252, at 23-25;
Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual
Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 169-70 (1996); Ronald Turner, Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment: A Call for Conduct-Based and Gender-Based Applications of Title VII, 5
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 151, 195 (1997) (arguing that Title VII should "prohibit misconductdirected at males or females who are harassed because, in the eyes of some, they are not suffi-
ciently 'masculine' or 'feminine"'). For citations to other academic articles, see Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d at 593 n.27.
161. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 591.
162. 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
163. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 574.
164. Id. at 591.
165. See id. at 574.
166. Id. at 575.
167. See id.
168. One commentator has described Doe as, in his opinion, "the most sophisticated andwell-reasoned sexual harassment decision to date." David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of
Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1725 (2002).
169. City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
170. See id., vacating 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
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ing differential treatment.171 Notably, Oncale did not mention gender stereotyp-
ing as a way of showing sex discrimination. The vacation of Doe and the decision
in Oncale raise questions regarding the extent to which the Supreme Court consid-
ers instances of sex stereotyping to be a proper basis for claims of sex discrimina-
tion in employment. 172
B. Resurrecting Doe
There is at least some sense that, in failing to mention the gender stereotyping
theory of sex discrimination in Oncale, the Supreme Court was not disapproving
of it.173 Several lower courts have reached the conclusion that Oncale's list of
ways to prove sex discrimination was not meant to be exclusive and that the Su-
preme Court's vacation of Doe was merely meant to express disapproval of Doe's
sex per se rule and not disapproval of the gender stereotyping theory itself.174 In
the courts of appeals, Doe appears to be alive and well, at least on the question of
sex stereotyping.1 75 In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 176 the Third
Circuit commented that Doe's flaw was not its expansion of the sex stereotyping
theory to include gender nonconforming males but its insistence that the causation
proxy of a sexual harassment claim can be satisfied merely by showing that "the
harassment has explicit sexual overtones."' 17 7 It concluded this from Oncale's"requirement that all sexual harassment plaintiffs must prove that the harassment
was discrimination because of sex" 17 8 and Oncale's vacation and remand of Doe
"'for further consideration in light of [this requirement]."1 7 9 The Bibby court felt
that the Supreme Court's vacation of Doe said nothing about Doe's gender-stereo-
typing holding because the Supreme Court had not explicitly "tum[ed] its back on
171. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-82 (1998).
172. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Same-Sex Harassment Issue Furrows Court
Brow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at A 14 (suggesting disposition of Doe indicates that "not all
the Justices were completely comfortable with allowing a same-sex harassment case to proceed
far beyond the cryptic boundaries of [Oncale]"); Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1742-43.
173. See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 1725.
174. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
discern nothing in [Oncale] indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaus-
tive rather than instructive."); Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 183 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D.
Pa. 2002); Jones v. Pac. Rail Servs., No. 00 C 5776, 2001 WL 127645, at *2 (N.D. III. Feb. 14,
2001) ("We see nothing ... in the Court's decision to vacate and remand Doe ... to indicate that
the [gender stereotyping] rationale is no longer viable."); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C
0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999) ("This court finds that the reasoning in
Doe is not inconsistent with Oncale and therefore Doe remains viable."), aff'd on other grounds,
231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
175. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001).
176. 260 F.3d 257 (2001).
177. Id. at 261 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 567 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also
Holman v. Indiana, 24 F Supp. 2d 909,914 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (characterizing Doe's holding
that harassment imbued with sexual overtones itself satisfies the question of causation as "ques-
tionable" in light of Oncale). Before Oncale was handed down, the court in Wilcox v. Dome
Railway Services, 987 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Ill. 1997), pointed to the difference between Doe and
Johnson v. Hondo, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997): "[W]hile Doe indicates that harassment so
imbued with sexual overtones is likely based on the gender of the victim, Johnson restricts such
an expansive interpretation and makes a distinction between sexual harassment and mere hostile
aggression." Wilcox v. Dome Ry. Servs., 987 F. Supp. at 688.
178. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d at 263 n.5.
179. Id. (quoting City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)).
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Price Waterhouse."180 From this, the Bibby court concluded that where "the ha-
rasser [acts] to punish the victim's noncompliance with gender stereotypes," the
victim has an actionable claim of sexual harassment. 18 1 Unfortunately, none of
this was of any help to Bibby, for the facts he alleged-being called a sissy, a
faggot, and taking it up the ass 182 -supported only a claim of sexual orientation
discrimination instead of one based on his failure "to comply with societal stereo-
types of how men ought to appear or behave."' 183 The slippage in this reasoning is
patent. Certainly if Bibby was accused of being a sissy (read, effeminate) and
having anal intercourse, these factors go a long way toward supporting a claim that
he defies (or is perceived as defying) societal expectations of his gender. 184 The
court nonetheless reached the conclusion that no reasonable finder of fact could so
conclude in the case at hand, 185 but confirmed that gays and lesbians could bring,
and win, gender stereotyping claims. 186
The court was unclear whether the primary problem with Bibby's case was
that "[h]is claim was, pure and simple, that he was discriminated against based on
his sexual orientation" 187 or whether "[n]o reasonable finder of fact could reach
the conclusion that he was discriminated against because he was a man;"' 188 in
short, whether the flaw in Bibby's case was one of pleading or one of proof. It is
true that Bibby's initial complaint, filed with the Philadelphia Human Rights Com-
mission, was for sexual orientation discrimination. 189 However, when filing his
complaint in federal district court, Bibby amended his complaint and alleged sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII. 190 The court nonetheless concluded that both
Bibby's claim and the evidence were deficient. 19 1
Similarly, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,19 2 plaintiff al-
leged sex discrimination based on his having been verbally harassed for being
180. Id.
181. Id. at 264.
182. Id. at 260.
183. Id. at 264. The court, in an aside, remarked that, in any event, what happened to Bibby
was probably not sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to sexual harassment. Id. at 264
n.6.
184. See Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) ("We do not think
that, simply because some of the harassment alleged by Schmedding includes taunts of being
homosexual or other epithets connoting homosexuality, the complaint is thereby transformed
from one alleging harassment based on sex to one alleging harassment based on sexual orienta-
tion."); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9,
1999) ("Co-workers speculated on Spearman's sexual orientation based upon their perception
of him as a man, and not on any comment by Spearman himself on his sexual orientation."),
aff'd on other grounds, 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 593
("[I]t is not at all uncommon for sexual harassment and other manifestations of sex discrimina-
tion to be accompanied by homophobic epithets."), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001
(1998); id. at 594 ("[Wle cannot just declare that a case is about sexual orientation, rather than
sex, simply because homophobia has reared its head along with sexism.").
185. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F3d at 264.
186. Id. at 265.
187. Id. at 264.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 260.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 265.
192. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
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effeminate. 193 The harassment consisted of coworkers referring to Sanchez as"she," insulting him for walking and carrying service items effeminately, and call-
ing him a faggot and a female whore. 194 The trial judge ruled in favor of Azteca,
concluding that Sanchez had not suffered a hostile environment and indeed had
produced no evidence that he was harassed because of his sex. 19 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit disagreed. 196 It determined that Sanchez's work environment was objectively
and subjectively hostile because of sex. 197 On this last point, the court determined
that an allegation of sex stereotyping was as cognizable for male plaintiffs as it
was for the female plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.19 8 The court cited
Oncale, Schwenk v. Hartford, 199 and Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.200
in support. 20 1 Ignoring the fact that Sanchez had been called a faggot, a factor
which has prompted other courts to characterize the alleged discrimination as based
on sexual orientation, the court concluded that much of the harassment Sanchez
suffered "reflected a belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act."'202 The
court limited its holding by stating it did not intend to imply that "reasonable regu-
lations that require male and female employees to conform to different dress and
grooming standards" were to be considered violative of Title VII.203
In a follow-up to Nichols, the Ninth Circuit considered the case of an openly
gay man who alleged sexual harassment against his supervisor and coworkers. 2 04
Like Sanchez in Nichols, Medina Rene, a butler at a hotel, was called names sug-
gesting his effeminacy.20 5 In addition, coworkers frequently touched Rene in a
sexual manner and made him look at pictures of men having sex.20 6 In his depo-
sition, Rene admitted he believed the conduct occurred because he is gay.20 7 The
district court's assessment was that Ren6 had made a claim of sexual orientation
discrimination, not sex discrimination, and granted summary judgment in favor of
the hotel.20 8 Rene's initial appeal to the Ninth Circuit was unavailing. The court
reasoned that Rene's reliance on Oncale was misplaced, since, although the facts
of Oncale were similar to Rene's, the Oncale court had held only that same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable, not that the facts of Oncale were themselves ac-
193. Id. at 869.
194. Id. at 870.
195. Id. at 871.
196. Id. at 872.
197. Id. at 872-75.
198. Id. at 874. See also lanetta v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Mass.
2001); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F3d 701,707 (7th Cir. 2000);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38
(2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999).
199. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
200. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
201. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d at 872-74.
202. Id. at 874. This reasoning inspired the court to abrogate DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co. insofar as that decision is inconsistent with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Id. at
875.
203. Id. at 875 n.7.
204. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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tionable.209 Moreover, the Oncale court did not hold that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is a form of sex discrimination. 2 10 Judge Dorothy Nelson, dissenting,
remarked that Rene's subjective belief about the cause of the harassment was irrel-
evant and that sexual assaults targeting only one sex should permit an inference of
sex discrimination in the same-sex context just as they do in the mixed-sex con-
text: "Enforcing Title VII in the mixed-gender context does not involve determin-
ing which pleasure center in the attackers' brains was stimulated by the attacks,
nor should it in this case."'2 11
The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment upon a rehearing en banc.
Its reasoning was that "grabbing, poking, rubbing or mouthing areas of the body
linked to sexuality ... is inescapably 'because of sex' 2 12 and that the conduct
alleged by Rene, as in Oncale, was objectively severe and pervasive enough to
constitute a hostile environment. 2 13 The court was emphatic that the success of
sexual harassment claims brought by women because of offensive touching of
their genitalia, buttocks, or breasts never turned on the sexual orientation of the
victim and could see no reason why sexual orientation should not likewise be irrel-
evant for a male victim. 2 14 In his concurrence, Judge Harry Pregerson argued that
the gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination supported reversal. Pregerson
stated that gender stereotyping of a man occurs where coworkers perceive "him to
be not enough like a man and too much like a woman ' 2 15 and noted that such
treatment often takes place in all-male workplaces where gender norms are po-
liced and those who transgress such norms harassed. 2 16 Invoking Price Waterhouse,
Oncale, and Nichols, Pregerson emphasized that "[t]he repeated testimony that his
co-workers treated Rene, in a variety of ways, 'like a woman"' constituted action-
able gender stereotyping. 2 17
The gender stereotyping theory did not fare as well in Spearman v. Ford Mo-
tor Co. 2 18 In this sexual harassment case brought by a gay man whose homosexu-
ality was suspected by his coworkers, 219 the plaintiff alleged several incidents of
name-calling culminating in his being likened to drag entertainer Ru Paul in graf-
fiti declaring he was a "fag" and had AIDS. 220 The district court held that the
allegations supported an inference that the harassment had been because of
Spearman's sex but granted Ford summary judgment nonetheless, since the ha-
209. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
210. Id. at 1209.
211. Id. at 1212 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
212. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1066 (citing Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)).
213. Id. at 1065, 1068. Although the court relied on Doe v. City of Belleville, it referred to
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986), for the proposition that unwelcome
physical conduct of a sexual nature is actionable sexual harassment where it is severe and perva-
sive enough "to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment." Id. at 1065, 1068,
214. Id. at 1066.
215. Id. at 1069 n.2 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 1069 n.3 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
218. 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
219. Id. at 1082-83.
220. Id. at 1083.
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rassment was not of the requisite severity or pervasiveness. 22 1 The district court
noted in particular that
Spearman appears to have been singled out because of the way he projected his
gender, or how his gender was perceived by his co-workers. Co-workers specu-
lated on [his] sexual orientation based upon their perception of him as a man, and
not on any comment by Spearman himself of his sexual orientation.222
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision, but disagreed that Spearman had ad-
equately supported an inference of gender stereotyping. The court thought it plain
that the name-calling and comparison to a drag queen made no statement about
Spearman's gender but were instead the products of coworkers' suspicion about
Spearman's sexual orientation and of their concern that he desired them sexually.
Nothing about the record, it seemed, supported Spearman's claim of sex discrimi-
nation.2 23 A subsequent decision from the Eastern District of Wisconsin has inter-
preted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Spearman as rejecting the position that co-
workers commit gender stereotyping when they speculate about another employee's
sexual orientation. 224
As these cases indicate, the gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination
is not one that courts are ready fully to embrace. Price Waterhouse, notwithstand-
ing the development of the theory of gender stereotyping has been stymied by the
judiciary's perception that by giving gender stereotyping claims life in the male-
on-male harassment context, the door will be thrown wide to coverage for sexual
orientation discrimination under Title VII. 225 There is some justification for this
concern as, in fact, it is difficult to distinguish sexual orientation discrimination
from gender stereotyping. 226 If a male employee is harassed for desiring other
males or for being effeminate, this is every bit as much about how his coworkers
feel he should be fulfilling his role as a male in society as it is about anxiety that
they may be the objects of his affection. 227 This point has been made many times
by able scholars; its relevance here is in attempting to understand how, fourteen
years after Price Waterhouse, there is still as a practical matter no uniform judicial
acceptance of gender stereotyping as a means of proving sex discrimination.
C. Rereading Oncale
Judicial ambivalence about gender stereotyping claims may be born of con-
cern about the direction Price Waterhouse seemed to want to take the law of sex
221. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9,
1999).
222. Id.
223. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F3d at 1085, 1086, 1087.
224. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 878 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
225. See, e.g., Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 183 F Supp. 2d 726,736-37 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
but see Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) ("This theory would not bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically
feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.").
226. See Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[T]he line between
discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex is hardly clear.");
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 878, 890 (E.D. Wis. 2002); Doe v. City
of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593, 593 n.27 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that sex discrimination and
homophobic epithets "often go hand in hand"), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
227. See, e.g., Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing
dismissal of complaint where plaintiff alleged "harassment including rumors that falsely labeled
him as homosexual in an effort to debase his masculinity").
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discrimination and the direction Oncale did take it. Before Oncale was handed
down, there was some optimism that a Supreme Court decision recognizing same-
sex sexual harassment claims would inspire coherence and consistency in sexual
harassment jurisprudence and that it might even serve as a springboard for judicial
and legislative efforts to include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for dis-
crimination in the workplace. 228 My own position was that same-sex sexual ha-
rassment claims would be a vehicle for outlawing sexual orientation discrimina-
tion by revealing to the heterosexual majority that heterosexuality is not a charac-
teristic protected by Title V11229 and would thus inspire broad support for passage
of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.2 30 I also believed that recognition of
these claims would emphasize the need to prohibit gender stereotyping and sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace. 2 3 1 Now, five years later, I see ample
evidence that my optimism was unwarranted.
What struck me most about Oncale was its "cryptic message about when same-
sex sexual harassment is actionable." 2 32 The decision left many questions unan-
swered despite the magnitude of disagreement in the lower courts over how same-
sex claims should be evaluated. 233 Though cryptic, the message of Oncale was
simple: the plain language of Title VII prohibits same-sex sexual harassment but
does not require the workplace to be androgynous or asexual. Furthermore, com-
mon sense is the standard by which to distinguish prohibited conduct from mere
intersexual flirtation and same-sex horseplay. Despite its simplicity, the decision
contained language unusual for a Supreme Court opinion. First, neither the word
androgyny nor the word intersexual had ever before appeared in a Supreme Court
decision. Second, before Oncale, the Supreme Court had used the word asexual
only to refer to reproduction by plants.2 34
There may be little significance to the chosen words beyond the obvious. They
may simply mean that sexual expression and differentiation between employees
based on gender need not be effaced entirely from the workplace in order to make
it compliant with Title VII. After all, it is true that only twenty to twenty-five years
ago, the circuit courts of appeals had rejected sexual harassment as a theory of sex
discrimination based on their assessment that employers would be able to escape
liability only by employing asexual workers. 235 "Asexuality," then, may simply
be borrowed from and meant to address the concern in those cases. But the unique
context of same-sexual harassment litigation belies this notion. Same-sex harass-
ment of asexual and androgynous employees has resulted in litigation that has
228. See Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining
the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 733-42 (1998).
229. See, e.g., Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F Supp. 697, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that
heterosexuality is not a protected characteristic under Title VII); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F.
Supp. 1169, 1175 n.6 (D. Nev. 1995).
230. Storrow, supra note 228, at 734-35.
231. Id. at 735-36.
232. Id. at 678.
233. Id. at 742.
234. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 306 (1980).
235. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated by 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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engendered the most disagreement among courts on the question of what conduct
supports an actionable claim of same-sex sexual harassment. In Goluszek v.
Smith,236 for example, factory worker Anthony Goluszek was repeatedly ques-
tioned about being unmarried, was urged to have sex with women, and was ac-
cused of being gay.237 He sued for sexual harassment but lost because the court
believed sexual harassment of the sort Congress intended to outlaw could occur in
the all-male factory where Goluszek worked.2 38 There are other cases of this
type-even cases that reject Goluszek's unorthodox analytical model-where courts,
while admitting that attacks on sexuality are potentially the most degrading and
dehumanizing of all harassing acts, ultimately conclude that the claims in these
cases are deficient because the conduct alleged was motivated by personality con-
flicts, the injury was aggravated by the plaintiff's hypersensitivity, the alleged
perpetrator's behavior was mere horseplay, or the claims themselves in essence
alleged discrimination based on the victim's known or perceived sexual orienta-
tion. In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,239 Mark McWilliams,
a cognitively disabled male, was subjected by his coworkers to teasing, questions
about his sexual activities, requests to masturbate him, and physical assaults in-
volving placing a broomstick to his anus and fondling him to the point of erec-
tion.240 Forced to his knees on one occasion, McWilliams was blindfolded and
made to "fellate" a harasser's finger.24 1 The Fourth Circuit held that sexual be-
havior between heterosexuals of the same sex is never actionable under Title VII.242
In dicta, the court suggested that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable where
the perpetrator's homosexuality or sexual attraction toward the victim can be
proven.24 3
Oncale's cryptic message makes it impossible to tell whether the Supreme
Court would have decided Goluszek and McWilliams differently. The Court may
be correct that a workplace made up solely of asexual employees may be devoid of
sexual harassment. But its use of the term "asexuality" in a manner never before
encountered in Supreme Court jurisprudence likely conveys more than the obvi-
ous. On the level of implication, this reference arguably captures and includes
within its ambit a host of sex discrimination cases involving plaintiffs who, like
Goluszek and McWilliams, are perceived to be sexually immature, sexually inex-
perienced, less than masculine, weak, effeminate, and so on. At the level of impli-
cation, this reference attempts to convey to courts who will hear such cases in the
future that such claims are unworthy of Title VII protection.
In addition, "androgyny" and "intersexual" are likely not-so-subtle references,
first, to the earring-wearing male plaintiff in Doe and, second, to transgender plain-
tiffs in general. If so, Oncale conveys the message that not all gender noncon-
forming employees will be protected from gender stereotyping. Instead of explic-
itly disapproving of the broad gender stereotyping theory in Doe, though, the Su-
preme Court chose to vacate that decision and to leave to the lower courts the task
236. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I11. 1988).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 72 .3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
240. Id. at 1193.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1196.
243. Id. at 1195 n.4.
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of determining how gender stereotyping claims should be evaluated. In this way,
the Supreme Court has retained the right to limit, even severely, the scope of such
claims should it choose to grant review in a future case.
If philosopher Michel Foucault is correct in his account of the history of sexu-
ality, "androgyny" is also a reference to homosexuals, who were unknown as such
until individuals engaging in homosexual sexual practices were defined in the nine-
teenth century not only as possessing irrepressible sex drives but also as harboring"a kind of interior androgyny." 244 The Supreme Court's first use of the word"androgyny," coupled with its vacation of a case brought by an androgynous plain-
tiff, makes a potent statement to the lower courts that they should not allow recov-
ery in cases where the plaintiff is or is perceived to be gender nonconforming. The
point is underscored by the host of cases in which homosexual plaintiffs already
find they cannot recover because, no matter the combination of facts, they are very
nearly always assumed to have been victims of sexual orientation discrimination.
The references to asexuality and androgyny 24 5 in Oncale are not inadvertent.
They function not only to describe a genderless and a sexless workplace but to
describe a group of individuals with alternative sexualities and sensibilities whose
claims of sexual harassment the law is not prepared to recognize. As such, Oncale
operates on two opposing levels. The decision is on the one hand a victory that
opens the door to claims of same-sex sexual harassment and potentially leads to-
ward an expanded recognition of sex discrimination to include sexual orientation
discrimination. In view of the circumstances under which it was decided and the
language used in the opinion, however, Oncale on the other hand is also a prece-
dent that could easily be used in the future to frustrate claims of sex discrimination
brought by gay and lesbian and gender nonconforming plaintiffs.
D. Gender Typing in Stereo
Having resurrected Doe, the federal courts are currently in the throes of decid-
ing who may bring claims of gender stereotyping and what evidence will support
them. These deliberations are reminiscent of the period pre-Oncale when the courts
were attempting to determine what set of facts would substantiate a same-sex sexual
harassment claim.246 Some of the questions that arose then were: (1) must the
perpetrator be gay;247 (2) must there be an imbalance of power in the workplace; 248
and (3) what conduct amounts to same-sex harassment instead of mere same-sex
horseplay? 249 The current concerns about gender stereotyping claims are similar:
(1) can the victim be gay; 250 and (2) what conduct amounts to illegal sex discrimi-
244. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans. 1978).
245. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
246. See generally Storrow, supra note 228, at 695-715.
247. Id. at 696 n.94 (citing decisions).
248. Id. at 698, 698 n.104.
249. Id. at 699 n.108 (citing decisions).
250. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 0452,1999 WL 754568, at **5-6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 9, 1999), aff'd on other grounds, 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000); Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the irrelevance of the sexual
orientation of the victim); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593, 594 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[W]e cannot just declare that a case is about sexual orientation, rather than sex, simply be-
cause homophobia has reared its head along with sexism."), vacated and remanded by 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
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nation as opposed to permissible sexual orientation discrimination? 25 1 Distin-
guishing between the two is difficult in part due to the equation of gender atypicality
with minority sexual orientation. 252 Also reminiscent of the period pre-Oncale
debate is the concern currently expressed by lower courts that they not validate
gender stereotyping claims in such a way that claims of sexual orientation dis-
crimination thereby achieve viability. Concern that the distinction be made with
great precision is based on the adamant assertions of many courts-including
Ulane-that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. 253 Convinced as they are that Congress is opposed to protection against
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, most courts are still not pre-
pared to admit or to draw inferences, as scholars have urged, that sexual orienta-
251. Courts acknowledge the difficult line-drawing required in distinguishing between gen-
der stereotyping and sexual orientation discrimination. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at
593, 593 n.27 (noting that sex discrimination and homophobic epithets "often go hand in hand");
see Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[T]he line between discrimi-
nation because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex is hardly clear."); Hamm
v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 878, 890 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
252. See STEPHEN 0. MURRAY, AMERICAN GAY 20, 250-51 (1996) (describing society's equa-
tion of homosexuality and effeminacy); Case, supra note 51, at 54 (arguing that "discrimination
against the effeminate man may be overdetermined, and effeminacy conflated with gayness");
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 122
(1995); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001); Williamson v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69,70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated insofar as
inconsistent with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins; Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th
Cir. 1979).
253. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (enumerating
unsuccessful attempts by members of Congress to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination
based upon "affectational or sexual orientation"). In Holloway, the court used a similar ratio-
nale to conclude that sex, as it is used in Title VII, is not synonymous with gender. See Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-62 (overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hart-
ford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)). See also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1086
(using Congress's rejection of attempts to broaden the scope of Title VII as evidence that it "had
a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg.,
Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he fact that the proposals were defeated indicates
that the word 'sex' in Title VII is to be given its traditional definition, rather than an expansive
interpretation."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d at 662 (failure to add sexual
orientation shows "that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind") (overruling
recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)); Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F2d at 1087 ("We agree with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that if the term 'sex' as it is
used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological female, the new definition
must come from Congress."); id. at 1085; Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F2d at 662-
63; Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1076 n.3 (Hug, J., dissenting) (noting four
failed attempts to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d at 592.
Twelve states-California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin-outlaw discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation. Catherine M. Brennan, Banning Discrimination on the Ba-
sis of Sexual Orientation, MD. B. J., June 2002, at 50.
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tion discrimination is gender stereotyping and thus constitutes sex discrimination. 254
In their struggle to distinguish between sex discrimination and sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, courts have reached the conclusion that as long as the alleged
facts include some instances suggesting gender stereotyping alone, without any
suggestion of sexual orientation discrimination, the claim may proceed on a theory
of mixed motives. 255 Thus, alleging solely that the plaintiff was called "fag" or
"dyke" would not support a gender stereotyping claim without other allegations
that, for example, a male plaintiff was called "femme boy," "princess," or "girl" or
that a female plaintiff was said to "wear the pants" or to be excessively "macho,"
each of the allegations in this latter group suggesting gender stereotyping alone,
untainted by any sense of having been motivated by sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.2 56 This approach narrows the scope of actionable gender stereotyping. It
254. Arriola, supra note 160, at 22 (stating that discrimination on the basis of gender
nonconformism is sex discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbi-
ans and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994) (reasoning that
discrimination against a man, but not against a woman, for dating a man is sex discrimination);
Valdes, supra note 252, 23-25 (suggesting that, if Title VII sex and gender discrimination pro-
scriptions were applied consistently, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would be
prohibited); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1158, 1183-84, 1186 (199 1) (reasoning that consistent Title VII analysis by courts would pro-
hibit sexual orientation discrimination, which is essentially discrimination based on sex stereo-
typing); Valdes, supra note 160, at 169-70.
District courts within the First and Ninth Circuit accept this reasoning. See, e.g., Centola v.
Potter, 183 F Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) ("The harasser may discriminate against an
openly gay co-worker, or a co-worker that he perceives to be gay, whether effeminate or not,
because he thinks, 'real men don't date men."'); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club,
195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002) (commenting that harassing a female employee for not
conforming to the stereotype "that a woman should be attracted to and date only men" could
support a sex discrimination claim). Courts within the Seventh Circuit appear undecided as to
whether this analysis comports with Title VII. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at
581 (recognizing sex discrimination in harassment based on failure "to meet his coworkers' idea
of how men are to appear and behave"); id. at 593 n.27 ("[A] homophobic epithet like 'fag' ...
may be as much of a disparagement of a man's perceived effeminate qualities as it is of his
perceived sexual orientation."); but see, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 0452, 1999
WL 754568, at *6 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999) (commenting that "continuous comments by a
harasser to a plaintiff, such as 'fag,' 'dyke,' 'queer,"' would be prohibited by Title VII but that
facts failed to meet severity and pervasiveness standard required of sexual harassment claims),
aff'd on other grounds, 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d at
1086 (concluding that "the graffiti that specifically stated that Spearman [was] 'gay,' a 'fag,' and
compared him to a drag queen confirm[ed] that some of his co-workers were hostile to his
sexual orientation, and not to his sex"); see generally Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbian and Gay
Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 617-33 (1992) (arguing that sexual orientation harassment is
indistinguishable from gender-based sexual harassment, for it is plainly sexual in nature, and it
is based on gender stereotypes).
255. Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 183 F. Supp. 2d 726,736 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d at 594'("The fact that one motive was permissible does not exonerate the
employer from liability under Title VII .... ").
256. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 593




would prevent, for example, a plaintiff whose effeminacy made other male work-
ers afraid he desired them sexually from surviving the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.257
This developing theory of gender stereotyping appears viable both for women
like Ann Hopkins and for effeminate men. 258 It does not, however, look promis-
ing for transsexuals. Indeed, a court as late as the year 2000 made the statement
that "[i]t is unclear ... whether a transsexual is protected from sex discrimination
and sexual harassment under Title VII. ' '259 This same court distinguished Price
Waterhouse by noting that Ann Hopkins was not a transsexual. 260 Furthermore,
the definition of gender stereotyping applied by courts in several cases is that the
plaintiff has been stereotyped based on her gender. 26 1 This formulation would
result in outcomes similar to Ulane, Sommers, and Holloway, since it does not call
into question the holding in these cases that a transsexual's gender for sex dis-
crimination purposes is always her biological sex. 262 There is at present no fed-
eral appellate precedent suggesting otherwise.
257. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 878, 894-95 (E.D. Wis. 2002)
(discussing Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d at 1085-86).
258. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (agree-
ing that "the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated
against for acting too feminine"); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1069 (Pregerson,
J., concurring) (characterizing gender stereotyping as perceiving a man to be not enough like a
man and too much "like a woman"); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581:
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is
long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does
not meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harrassed "be-
cause of" his sex.
259. Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 98-4254CVCSOWECF, 2000 WL 1585257, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000).
260. Id. Another court has suggested that Price Waterhouse's gender stereotyping theory
should not be applicable to cases involving transgendered crossdressers because Hopkins "never
pretended to be a man or adopted a masculine persona." Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.
A. 00-3224, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
261. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman
is forbidden under Title VII."); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408-09 (D. Mass. 2002)
("Sex stereotyping is central to all discrimination: Discrimination involves generalizing from
the characteristics of a group to those of an individual, making assumptions about an individual
because of that person's gender, assumptions that may or may not be true."); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001) (remarking that same-sex harass-
ment may be proven through "evidence that the harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief
that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender"); Holt, supra note 148, at
300 (characterizing Price Waterhouse as a case where a woman was discriminated against be-
cause she failed to exhibit the stereotypical characteristics expected of women).
262. Jennifer Levi expresses more certainty that gender stereotyping would help advance the
claims of transgender plaintiffs: "[A] biological male plaintiff who transitions to become fe-
male (a transsexual woman) may state a claim of sex discrimination against her employer when
she is treated adversely because the defendant prefers people to look 'stereotypically masculine'
or 'stereotypically feminine."' Levi, supra note 158, at 26-27. This suggests that courts have
defined gender stereotyping as applicable where a plaintiff suffers adverse treatment in the work-
place because he or she does not present a unified masculine or feminine image, no matter what
his or her gender is. To date, however, courts have not advanced this broad theory of gender
stereotyping but have instead applied the theory only to cases where the plaintiff's biological
sex was unquestioned. Only a very recent and unreported trial-level decision has
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For transgendered employees, those who do not seek anatomical alteration as
transsexuals do but who, unlike Ann Hopkins, have a gender identity the opposite
of their anatomical sex, this developing gender stereotyping theory may be a more
promising avenue to relief. In Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co.,26 3 for ex-
ample, a man dressed in traditionally feminine attire entered a bank for the pur-
pose of applying for a loan.2 64 Upon seeing Rosa's photo identification, which
showed him dressed in traditionally masculine attire, the loan officer told him he
could not apply for a loan unless he dressed in masculine clothing.265 Rosa charged
the bank with violating the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, but his suit was dis-
missed by the trial court.26 6 That court felt that Rosa had not suffered sex dis-
crimination but instead discrimination based upon attire or upon actual or per-
ceived sexual orientation. 267 The First Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that
the facts as alleged in the complaint could well support the theory that the bank
turned Rosa away because he was a man who was-and in the bank's view should
not have been-dressed in traditionally feminine attire.26 8
Jennifer Levi and Mary Bonauto of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defend-
ers wrote the appellate brief in support of Rosa, 269 and Professor Katherine Franke
wrote the brief for amici curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
Equal Rights Advocates. 270 Interestingly, in both briefs and in the First Circuit's
opinion, Rosa is referred to as a man.27 1 In their written reflections on the case,
however, both Levi and Franke reveal that Rosa's gender identity is female, and
they refer to Rosa as a woman.272 This inconsistency may mean that a transgendered
individual who does not desire anatomical alteration is comfortable alleging dis-
crimination on the basis of her anatomical and chromosomal sex. The early cases
appear to require this, and so perhaps it is simply a necessary legal strategy to
applied the gender stereotyping theory in the way Levi defines it. See infra notes 311-18 and
accompanying text (discussing Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 Civ. 1112 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)).
In the District of Columbia, plaintiffs may bring claims for discrimination based on personal
appearance. See Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994)
(finding that claim of postoperative MTF who "retainfed] some masculine traits" is actionable
under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act) (quoting plaintiff Underwood's Complaint);
see also Case, supra note 51, at 49 (advancing the view that "sex-specific grooming standards
violate Title VII").
263. 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).




268. Id. at 215.
269. The brief has been published at Jennifer L. Levi & Mary L. Bonauto, Brief for the
Plaintiff-Appellant Lucas Rosa in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Lucas
Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Company on Appealfrom the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147 (2001).
270. Franke, supra note 148.
271. See Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d at 214-16; Levi & Bonauto, supra note
269, at 149-50, 152-57, 160-61; Franke, supra note 148, at 164, 169, 170, 176.
272. See Katherine M. Franke, Rosa v. Park West Bank: Do Clothes Really Make the Man? 7




ensure a transgendered plaintiff survives her opponent's demurrer.273 If so, the
gender stereotyping theory appears to work perfectly well for this class of
transgendered plaintiffs.
There are two very important concerns that need to be addressed before rely-
ing too heavily on this legal strategy, however. First, for many years, in referring
to any transgendered plaintiff, courts and commentators have consistently used the
pronouns associated with her gender identity.274 The choice to do so is said to be
because the plaintiff considers herself to be that gender, appears in public as some-
one of that gender,275 and also refers to herself as that gender.276 In general, this
practice appears to be out of respect for transgendered plaintiffs.2 77 As noted
above, however, showing transgendered workers respect in this way has had little
bearing on the outcome of their employment discrimination claims. Transgendered
employees may have reached the point where playing along with what the legal
system demands of them is a cost worth the redress they receive by doing so. And
yet, on another level, playing along seems disturbingly retrogressive, substantiat-
ing the mistake about gender the law has made for so long in these cases. The
ramifications of this strategy are unknown.2 78 For some, the strategy presents a
rare and valuable opportunity to expose the absurdity of the law's position on gen-
der by showing how, in refusing to recognize a transsexual's gender identity, the
law permits "same-sex" marriages. 279 The point is not particularly convincing.2 80
Instead of helping to dismantle the absurdist legal approach to sex, the point about
same-sex marriage has generated a chilling judicial backlash. Just last year, the
Kansas Supreme Court strongly implied that transsexuals were devoid of gender
and, under the definition of marriage in force in Kansas, were not entitled to marry
at all. 28 1 Perhaps what the Rosa strategy will achieve for civil rights is worth the"collateral damage"'2 82 it causes along the way. Perhaps the strategy is "critical to
paving the road to trans rights."'2 83 There certainly is no doubt that the strategy
worked in Rosa, and perhaps that is enough for now.
273. In Naming, supra note 2, I suggested a similar strategy. See also supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Since
Ulane considers herself to be female, and appears in public as female, we will use feminine
pronouns in referring to her."); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748 (8th Cir.
1982) ("Inasmuch as Sommers refers to herself in the feminine gender, this court will likewise
do so."); Holt, supra note 148, at 288 n.23.
275. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1082 n.2.
276. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d at 748; Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d
717, 721 n.1 (Minn. 2001).
277. See Holt, supra note 148, at 288 n.23.
278. See Franke, supra note 148, at 145 (admitting, but not describing, reservations about the
outcome of Rosa).
279. See Frye & Meiselman, supra note 15, at 1032 (relating story of how two women mar-
ried in Houston after the Houston Court of Appeals declared void a marriage between a man and
a postoperative male-to-female transsexual).
280. See id. at 1033 (admitting that these "same-sex" marriages are merely "same-sex-ap-
pearing").
281. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002) ("The words 'sex,' 'male,'
and 'female' in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary
meaning of 'persons of the opposite sex' contemplates a biological man and a biological woman
and not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.").
282. Franke, supra note 148, at 146.
283. Levi, supra note 158, at 6 n.7.
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Another concern about the victory in Rosa is the easy distinction that can be
made between the contexts involved in employment discrimination disputes and
those triggering equal credit opportunity claims. 2 84 The hurdles to be cleared in
any attempt to carry Rosa over to the employment context will without doubt be
the rule permitting employers to establish reasonable dress codes that differentiate
between male and female workers 285 and the near hysteria that surrounds the issue
of what restroom a transgendered worker should use.2 86 Recently, and despite the
limited role a restroom plays in the working life of an employee, this latter issue
has become a flashpoint around which transgendered employees' right to be free
from discrimination stands or falls. 287 While practical suggestions of solutions to
"the problem" abound, 288 employers' response to this issue varies and courts are
still issuing opinions of remarkable insensitivity.2 89 The recent case of Goins v.
West Group290 is an example. Julienne Goins was a valued employee of West
Group who, two years before going to work for the legal publications giant, began
presenting herself as a female. 2 9 1 When she eventually began work at West, she
had not yet submitted to sex reassignment surgery.29 2 Initially, Goins worked in
West's Rochester, New York, facility but thereafter transferred to Minnesota. 29 3
Once there, some female employees at West voiced their concern that a man dressed
as a woman was using the women's restroom.294 In response, West's management
told Goins to use only single-occupancy restrooms.2 95 She refused, resigned in
284. See Levi & Bonauto, supra note 269, at 160 ("Even assuming, arguendo, that an em-
ployer might be able to justify a dress code according to business needs in the employment
context, there can be no plausible justification for basing creditworthiness determinations upon
a person's gendered appearance."); Franke, supra note 148, at 145 (recognizing that "an access
to credit case presented a better factual situation in which to get a circuit court to affirm Price
Waterhouse than did employment cases where the employer's desire to fire a man in a dress
might intuitively, yet mistakenly, resonate with the court's notion of legitimate business neces-
sity").
285. See Levi & Bonauto, supra note 269, at 160 ("[I]n those cases where courts have upheld
even sex-specific dress codes, they have done so because the dress or appearance requirement,
though sex discriminatory, can be justified by business justifications reasonably related to the
job."); Levi, supra note 158, at 18-19.
286. See Levi, supra note 158, at 14-18.
287. Litigation involving this issue continues to proliferate. See, e.g., Transsexual Sues over
Rest Room Ban, ADVOCATE.COM HEADLINES, Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.advocate.com/
newnews.asp?id=5825&sd--08/15/02 (on file with Maine Law Review).
288. See Frye, supra note 2, at 187-88 (articulating ways to address simultaneously the need
of the transgendered employee for access to a restroom and the concerns of fellow employees);
SHEILA KIRK, M.D. & MARTINE ROTHBLATT, J.D., MEDICAL, LEGAL & WORKPLACE ISSUES FOR THE
TRANSSEXUAL: A GUIDE FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION 136,143 (1995); JANIS WALWORTH, TRANS-
SEXUAL WORKERS: AN EMPLOYER'S GUIDE 83-86 (1998); JANIS WALWORTH, WORKING WITH A TRANS-
SEXUAL: A GUIDE FOR COWORKERS 35 (1999).
289. See, e.g., Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 717-26 (Minn. 2001) (reinstating
summary judgment against transgender employee who claimed segregating restrooms accord-
ing to biological gender violated broad prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination).
290. 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
291. Id. at 721.
292. Goins v. West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424,426 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 635 N.W.2d
717 (Minn. 2001).





protest, and ultimately filed suit against West under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act.296
In Minnesota, where Goins worked, state law prohibits discriminating against
an employee for having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. 297 Thus,
Goins's lawsuit was not burdened with the limitations of Title VII. Nonetheless, in
the trial court, Goins was compelled to provide discovery relating to the form of
her genitals. Based on this information, the court granted summary judgment for
West.29 8 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating the statute clearly protected Goins's
use of the women's restroom.2 99 The Supreme Court overturned this decision
based on its view that, in maintaining restrooms segregated on the basis of biologi-
cal gender, an employer does not commit gender identity discrimination. 30 0 This
conclusory decision does not address in any meaningful way the impact of the
restroom policy on Goins's statutory right not to be subjected to gender identity
discrimination. 30 1 At most, it seems to suggest that Minnesota's broad antidis-
crimination law might protect Goins against discrimination for having a noncon-
forming gender identity but not for expressing it. The force of the decision is to
empty much of the substance from the powerful protection against gender identity
discrimination passed by the Minnesota Legislature in 1993.
In an Eighth Circuit case decided after Goins, a teacher sued a Minnesota
school district for both sexual harassment and religious discrimination on the ground
that it allowed a transgendered teacher to use the women's faculty restroom. 30 2
Debra Davis had worked with school officials, parents, and psychologists to com-
plete her transition from male to female. 30 3 The school district's legal counsel
was of the opinion that the Minnesota Human Rights Act guaranteed Davis the
right to use the women's faculty restroom. 304 Relying on Goins, the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights stated that the Act "neither requires nor prohibits
restroom designation according to self-image of gender or according to biological
sex."'30 5 The district court granted summary judgment for the school district, and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed based on its assessment that Davis's restroom use did
not infect the working environment with "'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
296. Id. at 720-21.
297. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01(41)(a), 363.03(1)(2)(c) (2000) (prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination and defining sexual orientation as, in part, "having or being perceived as having
a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or female-
ness").
298. See Goins v. West Group, 619 N.W.2d at 427.
299. See id. at 427-28.
300. See Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d at 723, 725, 726.
301. The Goins decision echoes another equally perplexing decision interpreting the scope of"sexual orientation" under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism
Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 6 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 209 (1996) (reporting, in a case brought by a
woman a fertility clinic refused to inseminate because she was a lesbian, that the trial court
granted summary judgment to the clinic, reasoning that the Minnesota Human Rights Act did
not apply given Minnesota's policy not to condone homosexuality or same-sex marriage).
302. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., 294 F.3d 981, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2002).
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and insult.' 306 This was true in particular because Cruzan could elect to use other
conveniently located restrooms.307
Goins and Cruzan appear to be opposite sides of the same coin. They in es-
sence give an employer complete discretion to develop a restroom policy it feels is
most in keeping with the climate of the workplace. It would seem, though, that
employer discretion was something the Minnesota Human Rights Act was meant
to curtail. The force of these decisions, then, is to empty much of the substance
from the powerful protection against gender identity discrimination passed by the
Minnesota legislature in 1993.
Jennifer Levi expresses optimism that gender stereotyping is a theory that can
help advance the employment discrimination claims of even transsexual plaintiffs:
"[A] biological male plaintiff who transitions to become female (a transsexual
woman) may state a claim of sex discrimination against her employer when she is
treated adversely because the defendant prefers people to look 'stereotypically
masculine' or 'stereotypically feminine.' 308 Levi's prescience is reflected in a
recent case out of the Northern District of Ohio, Doe v. United Consumer Finan-
cial Services,309 said to be the only case supporting a transgendered employee's
right to sue for gender stereotyping. 3 10 As in Goins, the employer in this case
claimed to have received a report from a concerned employee that a man dressed
as a woman was using the women's restroom.3 11 Management also knew that
Doe's coworkers referred to her as Mrs. Doubtfire. 3 12 Doe is in fact a postopera-
tive transsexual female. 3 13 Unlike in Goins, however, the employer claimed it
could not ascertain Doe's gender just by looking at her.3 14 After receiving the
report, the employer took Doe aside and questioned her about her gender.3 15 At
that point, the employer asked Doe whether she had had or intended to have sex
reassignment surgery.3 16 When Doe objected to this line of questioning, she was
sent home and later learned that her employment had been terminated. 3 17 Doe
then sued for sex discrimination. 3 18 Her legal theory was that "United Consumer
either viewed her as a man who dressed and behaved like a woman, or it consid-
ered her a woman who was insufficiently feminine." 319
306. Id. at 984 (citation omitted).
307. Id.
308. Levi, supra note 158, at 26-27.
309. No. 1:01 Civ. 1112 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (unpublished) (on file with Maine Law
Review).
310. Eric Resnick, First TG Case Under 1964 Civil Rights Act Is Settled, GAY PEOPLE'S
CHRON. (July 12, 2002), at http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/storiesO2/02jull2.htm#story4
(on file with Maine Law Review).
311. Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 Civ. 1112, at 4.
312. Id. at 7.
313. Id. at 2.
314. Id. at 3.
315. Id. In response, Doe presented legal documents establishing her gender as female. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 4.
318. Id. at 1.
319. Id. at 6. In Naming, I speculated, "Perhaps the best, and as yet untested approach to
these types of claims, then, would be to advance transsexuals' discrimination claims upon two
theories, one for discrimination based on one sex, and another for discrimination based on the
other sex." Naming, supra note 2, at 324.
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Although the facts of Doe mirror those of Craig, the outcome at the trial level
was very different. In an unpublished decision ruling on the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court commented on the tension between Ulane and Price Waterhouse
and held that Doe's claim survived the motion because "her termination may have
been based, at least in part, on the fact that her appearance and behavior did not
meet United Consumer's gender expectations."'320 In other words, remarked the
court, United Consumer may not have discharged Doe had she been "'fully fe-
male' or 'fully male.' 32 1 Though groundbreaking, Doe is an unpublished deci-
sion and the parties have since settled the dispute. 322 It is unclear what, if any,
influence it will have on future discrimination lawsuits brought by transgendered
plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Responses to sex discrimination claims brought by transgendered individuals
are evolving. In contrast to what are now thought to be outdated cases concerning
transsexuals who ultimately were unsuccessful no matter how they framed their
discrimination complaints, today's courts appear prepared to grapple more judi-
ciously with the obvious point that "sex" in antidiscrimination legislation does not
refer to an individual's anatomical sex but to characteristics commonly associated
with that sex. This means that, for many individuals, whether transgendered or
not, actionable workplace discrimination occurs when they suffer adverse treat-
ment because their behavior challenges assumptions about what is appropriate for
persons of the same anatomical sex. The Supreme Court has suggested that this
kind of discrimination qualifies as sex discrimination but has refrained ever since
from commenting directly on the reach of this theory of sex discrimination. Unex-
pected terminology in the Oncale decision and the Supreme Court's articulation of
a common sense standard for actionable same-sex sexual harassment suggest that
any expansion or wholesale embrace of a gender stereotyping theory of sex dis-
crimination risks opening the door to sexual orientation discrimination protection,
long declared not recognized by Title VII. In the future, lower courts may remain
silent about the reach of the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination be-
cause the ramifications of widespread acceptance of the theory may lead to the
understanding that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.
In the abstract, sexual stereotyping or discrimination against gender noncon-
formity sounds like an ideal avenue toward ensuring that transgendered individu-
als receive redress for their workplace sex discrimination claims. But in its appli-
cation, this theory poses the same proof-of-sex hurdles faced by the unsuccessful
plaintiffs in Ulane and Sommers and would not be employed by those individuals
who, though transgendered like Miles, do not strike employers as gender noncon-
forming and who, as a result, do not suffer discrimination on that basis. Craig is a
powerful illustration of the limitations of this theory, as students working on both
sides of the case eventually discovered. They realized that Hopkins's superiors at
Price Waterhouse always considered Hopkins to be a woman but withheld her
promotion because she, in their estimation, did not act like one. Although any
320. Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 Civ. 1112, at 7.
321. Id.
322. Resnick, supra note 310.
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appellate court ruling in Craig should decide that there are genuine issues of mate-
rial fact as to how Craig was perceived at work and, thus, as to why she was fired,
there is ample appellate precedent to support a summary disposition of her case in
favor of Hudson Air Tool & Compressor Co.
Restrooms have become a powerful symbol for the right of the transgendered
members of our society to be allowed the very means to survive. The fear that
transsexuals will wreak havoc in the workplace by making other employees un-
comfortable in the restroom fuels a hysteria that greatly impedes any progress to
be made in the area of equal employment opportunity for the transgendered. Lucas
Rosa's success, when viewed in this light, was arguably related to the fact that he
was a potential client, not an employee. Regular restroom use was thus not an
issue under consideration in that equal credit opportunity case. Where the issue of
restroom use is what causes the employee to file suit in the first instance, however,
even where the law explicitly guards against discrimination against one's gender
identity, transgendered employees are said to have no right to use the restroom
most in accordance with their gender identity. Such an outcome in a very recent
case where protection of transgendered workers is strong portends the worst for
transgendered employees in other jurisdictions who have no hope of redress ex-
cept under an expansive view of gender stereotyping. Though unpublished, the
recent Doe decision from the Northern District of Ohio indicates that a different
approach to transsexuals' discrimination claims is possible. The decision provides
a glimmer of hope that the gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination will at
last afford transsexuals relief under Title VII.
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